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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1991, Victoria A. Stewart sued her former employer, the law firm of
Jackson & Nash, claiming that it negligently misrepresented itself and
fraudulently induced her to join the firm . Stewart claimed that she joined
Jackson ·& Nash after being told that the firm had been hired by a major client
for assistance with environmental law issues and that she would manage the
firm's environmental law department. When no environmental work appeared,
she was then, she stated, put to work on general litigation matters. According
to Stewart's complaint, her "'career objective-continuing to specialize in
environmental law-was thwarted and grossly undermined during her
employment with Jackson. '" 1 As a result, Stewart claimed damages to her
professional reputation, a loss of professional opportunities and "damage to
her 'career growth and potential. '" 2 On appeal from an order dismissing the
case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
Stewart's claim of fraudulent inducement survived a motion to dismiss and
remanded for trial Stewart' s claim that her career as a lawyer was harmed
when the firm failed to develop her expertise in environmental law. 3
Stewart's claim is indirectly supported in a recent article by David Stevens
in Barrister, the magazine of the Young Lawyers' Division of the American

• Professor of Law, St. Mary 's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas . Thanks to
Jim Ely for his suggestions . This article was supported by a generous grant from the Center for
Law, the Legal Profession and Public Policy .
1. Stewart v. Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86, 87 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'g in part and rev'g in
part 778 F. Supp. 790 (S .D.N. Y. 1991) (quoting Count I of Stewart's complaint) .
2. Id. (quoting Count I of Stewart's complaint).
3. ld. at 90.
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Bar Association. Stevens wrote, "In law, you gotta have a specialty. " 4
Specialization, according to Stevens, is "an essential investment is [sic] your
future. " 5 Stevens quoted an unnamed partner practicing in Los Angeles:
" 'Look, we need associates who are good generalists, .. . but we make
partners [those] who are marketable specialists. ' " 6
In another indication of the importance of specialization for lawyers, a
name partner at a large Dallas law flrm, discussing the future of corporate
legal work, was quoted as saying, "The traditional law flrm model will be
reserved for very sophisticated providers of very specialized services, so
specialized that they can't be done in-house. " 7 Simon Rifkind has declared
specialization the greatest change in the legal profession during his sixty years
as a lawyer, 8 and a recent report of the American Bar Association's Task
Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap concluded, "[l]t
has become increasingly clear that every lawyer is obliged as a practical matter
to limit the subjects on which he or she will keep abreast and develop particular competence. " 9
Lawyers today commonly make claims of specialization. 10 Part of the

4. David Stevens, Are You Partnership Material ?, BARRISTER, Fall 1992, at 14, 15.

5. Id.
6. Id. at 15-16.
7 . Bruce Rubenstein, Airlines Demanding Huge Cuts in Legal Fees: Will They Get Cuts in
Quality, Too ?, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, June 1993, at 1, 36 (quoting William A. Brewer, 110.
8 . See Simon H . Rifkind, Shift to Specializ.ationBiggestChangeinLaw, N .Y. L.J . , May 23,
1988, at S36 . Rifkind, a former federal judge, is a name partner in the large New York law firm
Paul , Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. An indication of the trend toward specialization is
the existence in the ABA' s Section of Litigation of 25 committees on substantive law. The inside
back cover of every issue of Litigation lists the committees .
9 . TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION : NARROWtNG THE GAP, AMERICAN
BAR ASS ' N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTtNUUM 42 (1992) [hereinafter, MACCRATE REPORT] (footnote omitted).
10. The July 1993 issue of Wisconsin Lawyer, for example, contained four professional
announcements of certification of specialization or induction into specialized legal societies. See
Personal Mentions, WIS. LAW. , July 1993, at 58 . Other professional announcements in that
issue, largely announcements of employment changes , usually included statements indicating the
limitations of the individual's practice. See id. (containing announcements placed by attorneys,
generally noting that their "practice is limited to," or that they "concentrate in," particular types
of legal matters) . These announcements, in a state whose supreme court has just recently rejected
an effort to "certify the certifiers, " suggest a profound change in the profession' s understanding
of what it means to be a lawyer.
In early 1992, the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Wisconsin voted 29-4 to request
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to create a State Board of Legal Certification, which would not
certify lawyers as specialists, but would regulate those agencies that did. Lawyers could use
approved certifications in advertisements . See Governors Back Proposal for State Board to
'Certify the Certifiers ', NEWSL. ST. B. WIS. , Apr. 1992, at 1. The proposed rule was published
in the February 1993 issue of Wisconsin Lawyer. See In the Matter of the Amendment of
Supreme Court Rules: SCR Chapter 14 Lawyer Specialization, WIS. LAW. , Feb . 1993, at 47 .
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present claim to professional status in the practice of law is the achievement
of expertise not in "law" as such, but in particular fields or aspects of law.
It is the lawyer's expertise in environmental law, bankruptcy, or real estate,
not the lawyer's degree in law or licensure by the state, that permits the
lawyer to claim the mantle of professional. As stated in the Macerate Report,
"changing law and new complexities have put an increasing premium on
specialization to maintain competence and to keep abreast of subject matter. " 11 Thus, Victoria Stewart's claim was that Jackson & Nash denied her
the opportunity to claim true professional status.
This claim of professional status, of course, often carries with it the
economic benefits accorded professionals and other experts in modem
American society. Just as important, however, is that this claim of professional status accords the claimant a more respected position within the legal
profession. The Wall Street Journal's report of Stewart's case, for example,
notes with apparent sympathy that Stewart "now practices general insurance
defense law in California." 12
It was not always so. The September 1939 issue of The Reader's Digest
contains a condensed version of Bellamy Partridge's book Country Lawyer. 13
The book is the story of the life of Samuel Selden Partridge, the author's
father, a lawyer in a small town in upstate New York during the Gilded Age.
In praising his father's work, Partridge wrote, "The city lawyer can specialize
in whatever field he likes. But the country lawyer must be ready to handle
almost any kind of case that comes along. " 14
Echoing this romantic perception of the country lawyer was Robert H.
Jackson, who, before entering President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's
administration and later joining the Supreme Court, practiced law for many
years in the small city of Jamestown, New York. About the country lawyer,
Jackson wrote:

The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently rejected the proposal. See Supreme Court Rejects
Specialization Board, Pro Hac Vice Proposals , NEWSL. ST. B. Wis., Aug. 1993, at l.
On the other hand, at its recent convention, the ABA approved certification programs of
the American Bankruptcy Board of Certification, the National Board of Trial Advocacy, and the
Commercial Law League of America . See Ellen J. Pollock, Certification Approved, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 17, 1993, at B2 ; Small Steps, A.B .A. J., Oct. 1993, at 125.
11. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 40 . The report continued, "Although solo and
small-firm practice continues predominately to serve individual clients, the lawyers in these
practice settings, like in all other practice settings , are increasingly becoming 'specialists. '" /d.
12. See Ellen J. Pollock, Firms Liable for Promises to Employees , WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1992,
at B1, B6 . This strikes me as revealing in two respects : first, it indicates that the firm for which
she worked was not prestigious enough to mention; second, it indicates that her claim was valid ,
for she now practiced "general insurance defense law," not environmental law.
13 . See Bellamy Partridge, CountryLaw.yer, in READER ' SDIG ., Sept. 1939, at 111 (condensed
version of BELLAMY PARTRIDGE, COUNTRY LAWYER (1939)) .
14. /d. at 117.
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He did not specialize, nor did he pick and choose clients. He rarely
declined service to worthy ones because of inability to pay. Once enlisted
for a client, he took his obligation seriously. He insisted on complete
control of the litigation-he was no mere hired hand. . . . The law to him
was like a religion, and its practice was more than a means of support; it
was a mission. He was not always popular in his community, but he was
respected. Unpopular minorities and individuals often found in him their
only mediator and advocate. 1s
These statements are important for the manner in which the lawyer is
defined as a professional. Bellamy Partridge defined his father's professionalism as a lawyer as a consequence of his father's facility with "law," not
just particular aspects of law. Robert Jackson defined a lawyer's professionalism as both a thorough knowledge of law and independence from both
clients and the community in which the lawyer practiced law. The emblematic
figure of the country lawyer was, of course, Abraham Lincoln. 16
Country lawyers were not the only ones taking this approach. Shortly
after World War II, a three-volume history of the large New York City law
firm known presently as Cravath, Swaine and Moore, authored by name
partner Robert T. Swaine, was privately published. 17 The firm, famous in
legal circles for institutionalizing the system of associates hired on salary to
work solely on firm matters, had been pilloried regularly during the 1930s in
the progressive press as a "law factory. " 18 Everything that appellation

15 . Robert H. Jackson, The County-Seat Lawyer, 36 A.B.A. J. 497, 497 (1950) . For more
on Jackson, see generally EUGENE C. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON
(1958); Philip B. Kurland, Robert H. Jackson , in 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2543 (Leon Friedman & Fred
L. Israel eds ., 1969); 3 MEMORIALS OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 47-172 (Roger F. Jacobs ed ., 1981).
16. See Charles W. Moores, The Career of a Country Lawyer-Abraham Lincoln, 35 A.B.A.
REP. 440 (1910) ; William L. Ransom, Abraham Lincoln ... Profession a Lawyer, Address at the
Annual Dinner of the Peoria Bar Association (Feb. 15, 1936), in 22 A.B .A. J. 155, 156 (1936)
("He attained professional distinction without leaving the ranks of those who will always be the
great reservoir of strength and stability for our country and our profession-the country lawyer.")
When he spoke those words , Ransom was President of the ABA. See id. at 155.
The Lincoln Legal Papers project, by searching nearly all of the county courthouses in
Illinois , is in the midst of a thorough reconstruction of Abraham Lincoln's career as a lawyer in
Illinois . See Joe P. Bean, The Undiscovered (So Far) Lincoln, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Sept. 30, 1993, at 6-B ; Cameron McWhirter, Unveiling the Mystery of Lincoln 's Early Years,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 3, 1993, at 1-L.
17. See ROBERTT. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS: 1819-1947 (194648) .
18. Ferdinand Lundberg, The Law Factories: Brains of the Status Quo , 179 HARPER'S MAG.
180, 189 (1939) . Karl Llewellyn earlier expressed the progressive concern with the influence
of law factories in the legal profession. See K.N. Llewellyn, 31 COLUM. L. REV . 1215, 1217
(1931) (book review) ("Let this be written large, for senior partners in lawjactories to ponder
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brought to mind-from meaningless, repetitive work to treating law as a
business rather than a profession-was anathema to Swaine. Swaine denied
the charge that the lawyers of the Cravath firm were simply specialists, 19
quoting at length Carl A. de Gersdorff s Memorial to his deceased partner Paul
D. Cravath: "'Cravath's organizing genius gradually transformed the firm into
a cohesive team containing men both with training and experience designed to
give them a comprehensive view of the problems of the office clients as well
as specialists highly trained through concentration in particular fields
'"20

Throughout American history, lawyers have defined and redefined what
it means to be a lawyer. 21 These acts of definition have been attempts to
communicate reasons for extending authority to lawyers in a culture largely
opposed to simple assertions of status and authority. The his~ory of legal
specialization is an important part of the modern (post-1870) liistory of the
legal profession.
Although American lawyers have rarely defined "professionalism" in
clear terms, 22 they have relied repeatedly upon two justifications of the idea
of law as a profession: (1) the acquisition of the particularized knowledge of
law, and (2) independence from both clients and the market when engaged in
the practice of law. The history of the legal profession' s treatment of
specialization is interwoven with the profession' s views of the importance of
knowledge and independence. In the early 1900s, some prominent members
of the profession expressed dismay at the changes in the legal profession.
Several biographies and autobiographies of prominent lawyers of the late
nineteenth century noted the displacement of the advocate, or trial lawyer, by

on : Law does not exist for corporation executives alone.") (emphasis added) .
19. See 1 SWAINE, supra note 17, at 575.
20 . /d. (quoting Carl A. de Gersdorft) . De Gersdorff's memorial tribute was published in the
1941 Yearbook of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and can also be found in
OTro E. KOEGEL, WALTER S. CARTER : COLLECTOR OF YOUNG MASTERS OR THE PROGENITOR
OF MANY LAW FIRMS app . Vat 379-88 (1953) .
21 . See SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE AMERICAN
PROFESSIONS, 1750-1900, at 67-87 , 206-39 (1991) ; JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 333-75 (1950). See generally DENNIS R. NOLAN,
READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (1980) .
22 . See Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional
Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES 189-91 (Robert
L. Nelson et al. eds ., 1992). A brief history of the rise of lawyer professionalism is contained
in RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 44-48 (1989) . Two books regularly cited by
historians and sociologists of the legal profession are MAGALI S. LARSON, THE RISE OF
PROFESSIONALISM : A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS ( 1977) and BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE
OF PROFESSIONALISM : THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN
AMERICA (1976) .
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the office, or corporate, lawyer at the pinnacle of the profession. 23 Those
elder members of the profession greatly regretted the passing of the advocate
from the apex of the profession and the devolution of the practice of law from
a profession to a business. In their view, the increasing importance of the
office lawyer was causing a decline in the profession of law because office
lawyers, particularly office lawyers in large law firms, were no longer
independent of their clients, but instead were captive employees of their
clients. The gravest charge made against lawyers was the accusation attributed
to Jay Gould: "'[B]rains were the cheapest meat in the market.'" 24 Those
more accepting of the change of the work of the elite25 lawyer claimed
professional status for office lawyers by defending their independence. The
apologists offered the oft-quoted statement of Elihu Root, for many the
epitome of the independent corporate lawyer: "'About half the practice of a
decent lawyer consists in telling would-be clients that they are damned fools
and should stop.' " 26
Office lawyers also were criticized for restricting their practices to
particular substantive areas of law. Unlike the country lawyer, who knew
"law," the office lawyer knew only certain aspects of the law. The specialist's
concentration of knowledge affected his status as a professional in two ways:
first, the specialist's general ignorance prevented him from acting as an
independent public servant; second, the specialist's lack of general knowledge
limited his judgment as a lawyer. The very attempt to specialize, then, formed
the basis for a critique of the office lawyer's lack of professionalism.
During the 1920s, the large law firm was institutionalized, and the
corporate lawyer was established as the exemplar of the successful lawyer. A
backlash against the work of the large-firm lawyer took place during the
1930s, but this backlash was not accompanied by an attack on the specialization found in the "law factory." Instead of suggesting a return to the ideal of
the generalist country lawyer, critics, largely progressive critics, suggested
ways in which specialization might be used to benefit society rather than the
interests of corporate clients of large law firms.
The call in the 1950s for increased professionalism in law included claims

23 . See sources cited infra note 51.
24 . George F. Shelton, Law as a Business , 10 YALE L.J . 275, 276 (1901).
25. By "elite" I mean only lawyers who practiced law in large law firms in major cities . This
term is not a qualitative judgment of their work .
26 . 1 PHILIP JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 133 (1938) (quoting Elihu Root). However, Jessup also
quoted a client of Root's as saying, "I have had many lawyers who have told me what I cannot
do; Mr. Root is the only lawyer who tells me how to do what I want to do. " /d. at 185 . ]essup
interpreted this comment, variously attributed to Thomas Fortune Ryan and William C. Whitney,
as indicative of Root' s ability to solve complex business problems within the law, not as
indicative of Root's willingness to bend the law for essentially illegal or immoral purposes . See
id. at 185-87.
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of the necessity of legal specialization. At that time, proponents of specialization flipped the traditional argument of lawyer professionalism on its head.
One aspect of this new argument was that the explosive growth in complexity '
of law, particularly federal law, ethically (or professionally) required lawyers
to place limits on their practices. Instead of claiming knowledge of all of law,
true professionals limited their practices to areas in which they were expert.
A second aspect of this argument was that particular expertise allowed lawyers
greater independence from clients. The expertise of legal specialists made
them authorities in particular fields of law, an authority which allowed them
to be more than the instruments of their clients' private interests and desires.
Most of the proponents of this new definition of professionalism were
academics and large-firm lawyers.
Opposing this redefinition of the
professional was the successor to the country lawyer: the general practitioner.
General practitioners, like trial lawyers and country lawyers before them,
retained the earlier notion of professionalism: because professionalism required
a lawyer's knowledge of law as such, any diminution in the amount of law
known by lawyers lessened the lawyer's professional standing.
The largest and most influential institution through which lawyers tried
to promote the formal recognition of specialization was the American Bar
Association (ABA). The ABA's initial response to suggestions to acknowledge
and regulate specialization by lawyers was the classic bureaucratic response:
during the 1950s and 1960s, the ABA fashioned several committees which
attempted to craft a proposal allowing state bar associations to recognize
specialization. With but a slight exception, the proposals of these committees
failed miserably. In the 1960s, the pressure to permit recognition of
specialties intensified. The institutional bar continued to state the goals of
specialization in professional terms, and implied that resistance to formal
recognition of specialization was based on economic, that is, nonprofessional
reasons. By the end of the 1970s, the ABA adopted a Model Plan of
Specialization, and several states, including California and Texas, structured
specialization plans. By that time, specialization in the practice of law was
acknowledged as part of the "professionalism" of lawyering. Opposition to
legal specialization was no longer undertaken by the country lawyer or general
practitioners, but by those claiming that specialization was an attempt by the
bar to extract monopolistic prices for legal services.
Lawyers not part of the elite of the profession first viewed the formal
acknowledgment of specialization as a way to create even more hierarchical
divisions within the bar. It was one thing for elite lawyers quietly to
specialize; it was another for the bar to formally recognize this as an aspect
of the professionalism of a lawyer. This formal recognition placed general
practitioners at a competitive disadvantage in relation to elite lawyers and
undermined their independence from their clients, because the general
practitioners' claims to knowledge were made more tenuous.
Formal recognition of legal specialization was largely underway when the
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Supreme Court decided Bates v. State Bar, 21 which constitutionally protected
the commercial speech of lawyers. The Bates decision had a twofold impact
on the specialization movement: it both hastened the process of formally
recognizing specialties and made formal recognition superfluous. Constitutional protection of commercial advertising by lawyers displaced the legal
profession from its claimed position between the state and the marketplace.
The fear generated by Bates was the regularly recurrent fear within the legal
profession that the practice of law would devolve from a profession to a
business. However, Bates also gave advocates of specialization the opportunity to use the economic threat posed by legal clinics to create acceptance by
general practitioners of this new understanding of professionalism. The ability
of general practitioners to advertise themselves to prospective clients as
specialists in bankruptcy, personal injury law, labor law, consumer litigation,
or the like, was not only an effective economic weapon against legal clinics,
but reestablished lawyers' claims to a particular knowledge that made them
professionals. For lawyers whose clients were largely individuals this claim
of particularized knowledge also led to a renewed claim of independence from
the market and, in addition, to a "unity" with specialists in large law ftrms and
a separation from lawyers practicing in clinics. Finally, because the original
arguments in the 1950s and 1960s in favor of formal recognition of specialists
were couched in terms of competent legal service, access to justice, and
greater benefits to the client, lawyers serving individuals used the same
arguments to stave off the claims that advertising would lead to the decline of
the legal profession and that specialization was no more than a form of
economic rent-seeking. But although Bates hastened the process of formally
establishing recognized specialties, the Supreme Court's decision in Peel v.
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission28 has effectively ended
the process, for the Court's decision effectively negates the power of bar
associations to regulate claims to specialization.
.
If all this is true, then there has been a transformation in lawyers'
understanding of the reasons justifying their position in society and, therefore,
a transformation in their understanding of what it means to be a "professional." Although this transformation has taken place in part for instrumental
reasons, 29 I will focus in this article on the ideological reasons for this
transformation. The ideological reasons include: the influence of the ABA in

27. 433 u.s. 350 (1977) .
28 . 496 U.S. 91 (1990) .
29. The instrumental reasons are the usual suspects : the industrialization of the United States;
the economic value of expertise, or product differentiation; the development and growth of the
large law firm; the impact of the regulatory state on the practice of law (and the creation of that
species of lawyer known as the "Washington lawyer"); the increasing proliferation of well-paying
institutional clients like large corporations; and, recently, the influence of advertising by lawyers
and the decline of the notion of loyalty between law firm and lawyer.
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promulgating and proselytizing specialization standards; a continuing insistence
by the legal profession of the importance of the idea of a unified bar; the large
increase in size and influence of the legal academy, consisting of persons
usually "specializing" (as teacher, scholar, or consultant) in no more than a
few subject areas of law; the American culture's amazing faith in experts, and
the ever-narrowing refmements of expertise; and, most importantly, a
continued belief by lawyers in the ideals of "professionalism," an ideal that
distinguishes the practice of law from business.

II.

THE AUTHORITY OF LAWYERS

Historians and sociologists of the legal profession tum regularly to de
Tocqueville to explain why lawyers in America have traditionally been
accorded such tremendous authority and power in an officially nonhierarchical
society. De Tocqueville observed that "lawyers ... form the highest political
class and the most cultivated portion of society. " 30 This has, for most of
American history, 31 reflected the position of lawyers. This authority traced
itself not only to the belief (or faith, if you will) in law, but to the belief by
lawyers themselves in the importance of understanding the "'artificial Reason
and Judgment of Law. '" 32
In his fascinating study of the history of professional authority in the United
States, 33 Professor Samuel Haber suggested that during the last half of the
eighteenth century and the early part of the nineteenth century, lawyers were
able to claim honor and authority in the practice of law for two reasons: (1)
a lawyer practicing law treated it as an honored profession rather than a trade;
and (2) a lawyer understood that practicing law was not simply the application
of the lawyer's skills or techniques, but a knowledge of the science of law. 34
Haber's model was James Wilson, signatory to the Constitution, Supreme

30. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 278 (Henry Reeve trans . &
Phillips Bradley ed., 1945) (1835) .
31. The long, dark night of the Jacksonian era eclipsed, for a time, the authority of lawyers
in American society, and has been a sore spot for apologists of the legal profession. See DEREK
BOK, THE COST OF TALENT: HOW EXECUTIVES AND PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID AND HOW IT
AFFECTS AMERICA 27 (1993) ("The years from 1830 to 1870 proved to be the nadir of the legal
profession."); ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 223-49
(1953) (calling the period "The Era of Decadence") . But see GERARD W. GAWALT, THE
PROMISE OF POWER: THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN MASSACHUSETTS 17601840, at 168-97 (1979) (concluding that by 1840, the legal profession in Massachusetts was
immune from frontal attacks on its authority).
32. STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMJL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 8 (2d ed . 1989) (quoting Sir Edward Coke's report of his response to King James I's
claim to supreme authority to interpret the law).
33. HABER, supra note 21.
34. See id. at 86.
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Court Justice, and first lecturer in law at the University of Pennsylvania. For
Wilson, " [t]he lawyers who practiced law as a profession ... looked to the
underlying principles o(science, and, secure in these, could range widely and
boldly in their practice. " 35
This twofold understanding of the profession of law was also exemplified
in sentiments offered by two famous antebellum Massachusetts lawyers, Daniel
Webster and Joseph Story. Webster's biographer, Claude Fuess, quoted a
letter from Webster dating to the earliest days of his law practice: "'Our
profession is good if practised in the spirit of it; it is damnable fraud and
iniquity, when its true spirit is supplied by a spirit of mischief-making and
money-catching. '" 36 As a young man, Joseph Story wrote a friend, "Law I
admire as a science; it becomes tedious and embarrassing only when it
degenerates into a trade. " 37
In 1871, in the Preface to his Cases on Contracts, Dean Christopher
Columbus Langdell connected university-based legal training with the notion
of law as a science. 38 He repeated that theme in 1886 on the occasion of the
250th anniversary of the founding of Harvard College:
[To improve the Harvard Law School, i]t was indispensable to establish at
least two things: first, that the law is a science; secondly, that all the
available materials of that science are contained in printed books. If law
be not a science, a university will best consult its own dignity in declining
to teach it. If it be not a science, it is a species of handicraft, and may
best be learned by serving an apprenticeship to one who practises it. If it
be a science, it will scarcely be disputed that it is one of the greatest and
most difficult of sciences. 39

The idea that law is a science has had a powerful hold on American
lawyers.40 Thomas Jefferson wrote that the science of law would be

35. /d.
36. 1 CLAUDE M. FUESS, DANIEL WEBSTER 86 (1930) (quoting January 19, 1806 letter of
Daniel Webster) . Webster later was notorious for his avarice . See James W. Ely, Jr., Book
Review, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 246, 248 (1991) (reviewing THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER,
LEGAL PAPERS, VOLUME 3: THE FEDERAL PRACTICE (Andrew J. King ed., 1989)) (quoting
disgruntled client as saying "Webster, like all the Lawyers, is unreasonable in relation to Money
Matters .").
37. Joseph Story, Letter to Thomas Welch (Oct. 19, 1799), in 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF
JOSEPH STORY 81 , 83 (William W. Story ed., 1851).
38. See C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi (1871) .
39. Christopher C. Langdell , Address at the Commemoration of the 250th Anniversary of the
Founding of Harvard College (Nov. 5, 1886), in A RECORD OF THE COMMEMORATION,
NOVEMBER FIFTH TO EIGHTH, 1886, ON THE TwO HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD COLLEGE 85 (1887) .
40. See generally THE GLADSOME LIGHT OF JURISPRUDENCE (Michael H. Hoefliched., 1988)
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threatened if it were not protected from lower classes of attomeys. 41 In
1827, Lemuel Shaw, Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts from 1830 to 1860, said, "[T]he law is a science founded upon reason
and principle, and no law can stand the test of strict inquiry which palpably
violates the dictates of natural justice . . . . "42 George Sharswood, whose
1854 essay on professional ethics became the primary source for the legal
profession's 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, wrote: "The American
lawyer must thus extend his researches into all parts of the science, which has
for its object human government and law .... " 43 In his biography of Joseph
H. Choate, Theron Strong favorably compared the "court lawyer" to the
"business lawyer" on the ground that "[t]he business of the Court lawyer calls
for intellectual capacity of a high order, developed by assiduous study of the
law as a science, and by literary culture. "44 And in two essays concerning
the legal thought and practice of elite lawyers from 1870 through the early
years of the twentieth century, Professor Robert W. Gordon noted the
recurrent theme of the development of the science of law. 45
The other pillar of professionalism, independence, was tied to the notion
of the lawyer as "officer of the court. " 46 As an officer of the court, a lawyer

(collecting speeches from 18th- and 19th-century lawyers which often advert to the idea of Jaw
as a science). I have discussed the connection between the development of the modern legal
profession and the belief that Jaw is a science in Michael Ariens, Modem Legal Times: Making
a Professional Legal Culture, 15 J. AM. CULTURE 25 (1991) .
41. "I think the bar of the General Court a proper and an excellent nursery for future judges
if it be so regulated as that science may be encouraged and may live there. But this can never
be if an inundation of insects is permitted to come from the county courts and consume the
harvest." Thomas Jefferson, Letter to George Wythe (Mar. 1, 1779), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 166 (PaulL. Forded., 1893), quoted in ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR
THE PuBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 404 (1921).
42 . Lemuel Shaw, Profession of the Law in the United States, Address before the Suffolk,
Mass. Bar (May 1827), in 7 AMER. JURIST AND L. MAG. 56, 68 (1832) .
43. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 26 (5th ed. 1884), reprinted
in 32 A.B.A. REP. 26 (1907).
44. THERON G. STRONG, JOSEPH H. CHOATE 128 (1917).
45 . The essays are Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of
American Enterprise, I870-I920 [hereinafter Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice], in
PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 82-90 (Gerald L. Geison ed ., 1983);
Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Practices of New York
City Lawyers, I870-I9IO [hereinafter Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual], in THE NEW HIGH
PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51, 52-57 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984)
[hereinafter THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS).
46. See JULIUS H. COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 22 (rev. ed. G.A. Jennings
Co. 1924) (photo. reprint 1979) ("It is because of the lawyer's position as an officer of the court
that the disciplinary process is made practicable."); ARTHUR H. DEAN, WILLIAM NELSON
CROMWELL 1854-1948: AN AMERICAN PIONEER IN CORPORATION, COMPARATIVE, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (1957) (claiming that William Cromwell, a first-generation office
lawyer, "never forgot that he was first and foremost an 'officer of the court'"); HABER, supra
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was under a duty to serve the interests of justice, not just the interests of the
client. Even though the client paid for the lawyer's service, the lawyer was
a professional, whose main purpose was "[p]ursuit of the learned art in the
spirit of a public service. " 47 Because the making of money was merely an
incidental purpose of the legal profession, 48 the lawyer's duty to the cause of
justice should not and could not be purchased by the client. Once elite legal
practice shifted from advocacy to office practice, however, the concept of the
lawyer as an "officer of the court" was stripped of its original meaning.
Lawyers' claims that their public duties made them independent of their clients
were no longer available. Coupled with the increasing wealth generated by
such office lawyers and the firms built around corporate practice, the prominence of the office lawyer threatened the identity of the profession as a
profession.
At the same time, however, the increasing complexity of the work
undertaken by lawyers, particularly office lawyers, created a greater strength
in the "law as science" concept. 49 Knowledge remained a necessary
component of being a true professional. However, the professionalism of
office lawyers was attacked because their narrow expertise robbed them of any
breadth of judgment. so

note 21, at 208 (citing, among others, Thomas Cooley); BERYL H. LEVY, CORPORATION
LAWYER: SAINT OR SINNER? 173-74 (1961) (linking the independence of lawyers to the idea of
the lawyer as "officer of the court"); REED, supra note 41, at 3 ("From their earliest origins the
law has accorded to these 'officers of the court' certain special and exclusive privileges, which
set them apart from the mass of the people as truly as if they were, in a strict sense, public officials ."); SHARSWOOD, supra note 43, at 58 & nn.1-2; id. at 83 ("Now the lawyer is not merely
the agent of the party; he is an officer of the court."); Alfred Hemenway, The American Lawyer,
Address at the 1905 Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, in 28 A.B.A. REP. 390,
390 (1905) ("On admission to the Bar each [lawyer] becomes an officer of the court."); William
L. Ransom, Some Impressions of American Lawyers Today, Address at the 1936 Annual Meeting
of the American Bar Association, in 22 A.B.A. J. 663, 664 (1936) (commenting as ABA
President that "[t]he Bar and people are coming to realize that lawyers as well as Courts are a
vital part of the administration of impartial justice under law; that the lawyers of a State are the
officers of its Courts and are responsible to its Courts"); An Ancient And Honorable Profession,
11 MARQ. L. REv. 113, 113 (1927) ("'The law is an ancient and honorable profession. An
attorney at law is an officer of the court, and an inherent part of our judicial system.'") (quoting
In re Board of Law Examiners, 210 N.W. 710, 711 (Wis. 1926) (Doerfler, J.)).
47. POUND, supra note 31, at 5.
48 . ld.; accord CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 12 (1908) ("In fixing fees it should
never be forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere
money-getting trade.").
49. See essays cited supra note 45 .
50 . See Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, Address to the Chicago Bar Association (Jan.
3, 1916), in 10 ILL. L. REv. 461 , 469-70 (1916) ("The growing intensity of professional life
tended also to discourage participation in public affairs, and thus the broadening of view which
comes from political life was lost. The deepening of knowledge in certain subjects was purchased
at the cost of vast areas of ignorance and grave danger of resultant distortion of judgment.");
Robert H. Jackson, Address to Beaver County Bar Association, Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania(Mar.
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Ill. A HISTORY OF SPECIALIZATION
A. The Changing of the Bar: 1870-1900
During the last third of the nineteenth century, the work of both elite and
nonelite lawyers changed markedly. This change apparently precipitated a
crisis of professionalism among elite lawyers during the flrst decade of the
twentieth century, a crisis caused in part by a fear of the impact of increased
lawyer specialization.
A number of biographies exist of elite lawyers whose practices encompassed much of the Gilded Age. 51 These works, written between 1917 and
1940 and almost exclusively concerned with the practice of law in New York
City, unanimously agreed that the "great" lawyers before the turn of the
century were advocates, or in today's parlance, trial lawyers. 52 Underlying
the authors' extensive recounting of the relationship of the subjects to the great
events or great people of their times, however, were efforts to recount the lost
golden age of the legal profession. A wistfulness is evident on the part of the
authors (and often on the part of the subjects as well) for a type of legal

30, 1935}, quoted in Eugene C. Gerhart, Organization for the Practice of Law: How Lawyers
Conduct Their Practice, 37 A.B .A. J. 729, 731 (1951) ("No person who rightly appreciates the
advantages of the division of labor will deny an important place in an advisory and consultive
way to the specialist, but his seat is not the seat of judgment. That calls for a breadth of view
and understanding that may not be so deep as the specialist's, but must be broader."); Shelton,
supra note 24, at 279 ("Specialization in the Jaw and the devotion of years to a perfection of
knowledge in one branch, results in only a partially developed man.").
51. Some of those biographies are: JOSEPHS . AUERBACH, THE BAR OF 0rHER DAYS (1940)
{a collection of short biographies) ; CHESTER L. BARROWS, WILLIAM M. EVARTS: LAWYER,
DIPLOMAT, STATESMAN (1941) ; WILLIAM N. BRIGANCE, JEREMIAH SULLIVAN BLACK: A
DEFENDER OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TEN COMMANDMENTS (1934); ALEXANDER C.
FLICK, SAMUEL JONES TILDEN : A STUDY IN POLITICAL SAGACITY {1939); THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (David J. Danelski & JosephS . Tulchin eds., 1973)
[hereinafter AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF HUGHES] ; PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT (1938) ;
and EDWARDS. MARTIN, THE LIFE OF JOSEPH HODGES CHOATE (1920) ; STRONG, supra note
44; and THERON G. STRONG, LANDMARKS OF A LAWYER'S LIFETIME (1914) . An excellent study
of prominent lawyers in late-19th-century New York City is contained in GEORGE MARTIN,
CAUSES AND CONFLICTS: THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE AssOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, 1870-1970 (1970) [hereinafter GEORGE MARTIN , CAUSES AND CONFLICTS] .
An autobiography that focuses on a slightly later period is GEORGE W. PEPPER, PHILADELPHIA
LAWYER (1944) .
Although these works are more hagiography than biography, they provide helpful insights.
The most successful portrayals are Jessup 's Elihu Root, a very sympathetic but full discussion of
Root's work, and Brigance's Jeremiah Sullivan Black, which successfully rescues a figure from
oblivion.
52. See, e.g. , BARROWS, supra note 51, at viii (" ' [Evarts's biography] will preserve to
posterity the portraiture of a great lawyer and advocate of the time before the day of specialists
when the leaders of the Anerican Bar were great lawyers and advocates'") (quoting George F.
Hoar).
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practice no longer undertaken by elite lawyers, and one result was that the
authors discussed the "great" cases tried by nineteenth-century lawyers in
great detail.
For example, the biographers of Joseph Hodges Choate and William M.
Evarts, long partners in the firm of Evarts, Southmayd and Choate, spent a
great deal of time regaling the reader with stories of cases tried against or with
James Coolidge Carter, 53 David Dudley Field, 54 William Curtis Noyes, 55
and Charles O'Conor.56 At some point before the end of the century, the
authors dejectedly noted, there was a shift in the practice of law from the
advocate to the "office lawyer. " 57 One reason for the unhappiness of the
biographers was the passing of the individual lawyer from the center of study
and a turn to the importance of the large law firm. 58 A second reason was
the perception that this change in the "best" lawyers was a cause of the decline
in the idea of law as a profession.
The best example of this change in the practice of law is found in The
Autobiography of Thomas L. Chadboume.59 Chadbourne began his career
53. James Coolidge Carter (1827-1905) is best remembered today as a vociferous foe of
codification efforts led by his rival David Dudley Field. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 403-05 (2d ed. 1985). According to George Martin, Carter "was
probably the most famous lawyer of the 1890's." GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS,
supra note 51, at 173. Although no full-length biography of Carter exists, a couple of short ones
are Frederick C. Hicks, James Coolidge Carter, in 4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 536
(Allen Johnson & Dumas Malone eds ., 1943), and George A. Miller, James Coolidge Caner,
in 8 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 3 (William D. Lewis ed., 1909).
54. David Dudley Field (1805-94) was the author of the Field Code, New York's Code of
Civil Procedure, and was an ardent proponent of codification of the laws . See generally HENRY
M. FIELD, THE LIFE OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD (1898); DAUN VAN EE, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW (1986); Frederick C. Hicks , David Dudley Field, in 6
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 360 (Allen Johnson& Dumas Malone eds., 1943); Helen
K. Hoy, David Dudley Field, in 5 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 125 (William D. Lewis ed.,
1908).
55. According to William Evarts's biographer, William Curtis Noyes (1805-64) was not as
well known as several other New York lawyers, "but Evarts never opposed a higher type of
lawyer. " BARROWS, supra note 51, at 59. GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS contains no biography
of Noyes, but a brief essay on Noyes can be found in Austin L. Moore, William Cunis Noyes,
in 13 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 592 (Dumas Malone ed ., 1943).
56. Charles O'Conor (1804-84) was the oldest of these advocates . He always practiced
without partners, though he used future Harvard Law School Dean Christopher Columbus
Langdell as an assistant to help prepare cases . See GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS,
supra note 51, at 20 & n.*. No full-length biography of O'Conor exists, but see Henry E.
Gregory , Charles O'Conor, in 5 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 81 (William D. Lewis ed ., 1908),
for a short biography of O'Conor.
57. See, e.g. , GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, supra note 51, at 187.
58. Law firm biographies not cited elsewhere include WILLIAM W. CLARY, HISTORY OF THE
LAW FIRM OF O'MELVENY AND MYERS: 1885-1965 (1966) and HENRY TAFT, A CENTURY AND
A HALF AT THE NEW YORK BAR (1938) .
59. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS L. CHADBOURNE (Charles C. Goetsch & Margaret L.
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in Chicago as a clerk to former Judge Russell Wing, a trial lawyer. 60 In
1893, Chadbourne moved to Milwaukee to open his own practice. 61 In his
view, the panic of 1893 "worked a tremendous change in the legal profession. " 62 Chadbourne turned from representing individuals in the trial of civil
and criminal cases to working in behalf of corporations whose operations were
affected by laws regulating commerce. Three years later and only twenty-five
years old, Chadbourne returned to Chicago to practice law with Judge
Wing. 63 He wrote that he intended to "work a change in Wing's practice. " 64 Although Chadbourne initially accepted criminal and personal injury
cases brought to the firm, he recalled, "It finally dawned on me that with the
same thought and energy, we could make much more money by changing our
practice and making it more corporate and commercial and less trial and
criminal. " 65 At the age of thirty-one, Chadbourne moved to New York City
and practiced corporate law exclusively. 66 His practice, combined with
interrelated business ventures, made Chadbourne a multi-millionaire.
Chadbourne's writing contained none of the wistfulness found in the generation
of elite lawyers that preceded him. There was only the quest for the deal, and
for money.
That a desire for wealth was the reason Chadbourne decided to become
an office lawyer did not make him exceptional. It is clear, from this distance,
that the accumulation of wealth was the driving force behind much of the
migration of the elite of the profession from court work to corporate work.
First-generation corporate lawyers like William Nelson Cromwell, Francis
Lynde Stetson and Paul D. Cravath earned enormous fortunes. Another firstgeneration office lawyer, John W. Sterling, 67 who "never under any circumstances appeared in court, "68 made Yale University the residual beneficiary
of his estate. By the time it was fmally disbursed, the amount received by
Yale totaled more than $35,000,000. 69 Second-generation corporate lawyer
John W. Davis, who first practiced law in West Virginia in the late nineteenth

Shivers eds ., 1985). Chadbourne, with the help of journalist George Creel, penned this
autobiography in 1928, when he was 57. Although he lived for another decade, he never updated
this autobiography, which he wrote for his young daughters.
60 . See id. at 20 .
61. See id. at 27.
62. ld. at 28 .
63. See id. at 31.
64. ld. at 34.
65 . /d.
66. See id. at 49.
67. On Sterling, and the firm he helped found, see generally WALTER K . EARLE, SHEARMAN
AND STERLING (1973).
68. GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, supra note 51, at 194.
69. ld.; EARLE, supra note 67, at 188-89.
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century, moved to New York City in 1921 and enjoyed an average annual
income of $400,000 before the end of the decade, although this declined to an
average of $275,000 after the Crash of 1929.70 In the depression year of
1936, John Foster Dulles of Sullivan and Cromwell earned $377,000. 71
Because a lawyer's independence from both his client and the passions of
the community was a strongly held justification for treating law as a profession
rather than a business, the idea that the wealthiest lawyers might be dependent
upon their clients was an extremely unattractive proposition to many lawyers.
The fact that many of the wealthiest lawyers were perched atop large pyramids
of lower-paid lawyers led to some distrust of the large law firm's professional
ethos. At least two prominent lawyers who benefitted fmancially from this
transformation of the legal profession, Charles Evans Hughes and Elihu Root,
clearly attempted to distance themselves from any dependence on the clients
of the large law firm.
After Charles Evans Hughes resigned from the Supreme Court and failed
in his 1916 presidential bid, he returned to the practice of law. His Autobiographical Notes state, "I was especially desirous to have the position of
independent counsel, " 72 resulting in his declining offers to join Guggenheim
Brothers and Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft before finally deciding to rejoin
his old law partners as counsel. 73 After serving for four years as Secretary
of State to Presidents Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, Hughes again
returned in 1925 to the private practice of law. He later wrote of this time,
"As in the years before I became Secretary of State, I maintained a position
of complete independence at the bar, taking cases which I thought should be
argued, regardless of popular feeling, and refusing those in which for one
reason or another I did not care to appear. "74 After Elihu Root first entered
public life, his return, temporarily in 1904-05 and permanently in 1915, to the
private practice of law did not involve joining a law firm as a partner. Root
decided not to join his old law firm, but "confined himself to acting as

70. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Lawyers and Clients in the Twentieth Century, in AMERICAN LAw
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 353, 355 (LawrenceM. Friedman
& Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1978). On Davis, see generally WILLIAM E. HARBAUGH, LAWYERS'
LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS (1973).
71. NANCY LISAGOR & FRANK LIPSJUS, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE
LAW FIRM SULLIVAN AND CROMWELL 110 (1988). Due to a new partnership agreement in
which Dulles agreed to reduce his percentage of firm profits, this amount was actually lower than
Dulles would otherwise have received . See id. at 109-10. Nearly half of American lawyers
earned less than $2 ,000 a year at the time. /d. at 109.
72 . AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF HUGHES, supra note 51 , at 186.
73 . /d. at 186 & n.2.
74 . /d. at 285. When Hughes was nominated for the second time to the Supreme Court in
1930, his nomination was nearly derailed by criticism of his affinity for work for wealthy
corporations. /d. at 295-97. Hughes has been criticized for attempting to avoid the consequences
of his choice to work in behalf of large corporations in Auerbach, supra note 70, at 355-56.
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counsel. " 75
The decisions by Root and Hughes to act as independent counsel rather
than as partners in law firms may be usefully contrasted with William Evarts's
decision in the 1880s. After serving as Secretary of State for President
Rutherford B. Hayes from 1877 to 1881 and representing the United States for
a short time at the Paris Monetary Conference, Evarts returned at age sixtyfour to his old law firm and the practice of law. These divergent career
decisions between Hughes and Root, on the one hand, and Evarts, on the
other, suggest that between the 1880s and 1915 there was not only a
substantial shift in the practice of law, but also a shift in the relations among
lawyer, law firm, and client.
This shift in the practice of law has become part of the story of the rise
of many oftoday's large law firms. One example is _the New York City law
firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. The death of sixty-one-year-old Algernon
Sullivan in December 1889 gave William Cromwell the opportunity to redirect
the practice of the firm away from the courts, favored by Sullivan, and toward
office practice, favored by Cromwell. 76 The shift in the relations among
lawyer, law firm, and client was a precipitating cause in creating a crisis of
professionalism. Although this crisis peaked roughly during the first two
decades of the twentieth century, it remains with us today.
The standard story is that the increasing importance of the corporation
in American economic development, and the legal fees generated by the need
for corporate counselling, led to two developments: first, the substitution of
corporate counselling for advocacy as the leading form of the practice of law;
and second, the creation of the large law firm. 77 Hurst's seminal history of
American law places these changes in the practice of law in the late nineteenth
century. 78 Samuel Haber's work dates the rise of the large law firms at the

75. 1 JESSUP, supra note 26, at 413 .
!
76. LISAGOR & LIPSIUS, supra note 71, at 23 .
\
77.
Around the tum of the century, the professional talents of courtroom advocacy
and brief-making were referred to again and again as "lost arts," as the occupation
of the successful lawyer centered more and more upon counseling clients and offering
business advice. General and versatile talent, less needed than in the old days, was
replaced by specialized practice and the division of labor within law firms. The firms
themselves grew larger; the process of concentration and combination in business,
which limited profitable counseling to fewer and larger firms, engendered a like
concentration in the law. Metropolitan law firms, as they grew larger and more
profitable, moved into closer relationships with and became "house counsel" of the
large investment houses, banks, or industrial firms that provided them with most of
their business. But the relation that was the source of profit brought with it a loss of
independence to the great practitioners .
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 158-59 (1955).
78. See HURST, supra note 21, at 297-98, 306-07.
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tum of the century. 79 George Martin's history of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, a voluntary bar association of the most prominent
lawyers in New York, suggests that the changes began about 1890, 80 and
Chadbourne believed that the shift in practice was a consequence of the panic
of 1893. 81
Although it should not surprise lawyers that a depression may result in an
increase in business, the instrumental reason for such an abrupt change can be
traced to the particular work created by the panic: railroad reorganization. 82
As noted by Paul D. Cravath nearly a quarter of a century later, the
reorganization of a railroad's assets and liabilities rarely meant the dissolution
of the railroad. That is, even during the period of reorganization, the
continued existence of the railroad was a given, unlike the case in which a
manufacturing company was reorganized. 83 Reorganization counsel, then,
were given the opportunity to meet and impress future clients with their work
reorganizing railroads. Chadbourne's autobiography makes clear that the
reorganization lawyer's work was quite lucrative. These instrumental reasons,

79 . See HABER, supra note 21, at 232-33.
80. GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, supra note 51, at 187. At least one
commentator of the time agreed, observing: "Litigation has declined, and counsel work has
become the leading feature of practice. The chief forum of the lawyer has been transferred from
the court house to the office." The Decline of Litigation, 1 AM. LAW. 5, 5 (1893) quoted in
MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PuBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA
350 (1977).
81 . See THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS CHADBOURNE, supra note 59, at 28; accord Robert
T. Swaine, Impact of Big Business on the Profession: An Answer to Critics of the Modem Bar,
35 A.B .A. J. 89, 89, 91 (1949) (noting that "during the 1880's and 1890's, many leading
advocates of New York, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago were devoting an increasing part of
their practice to office work "). Walter Earle, partner in and historian of the law firm of
Shearman & Sterling, suggested that the change in the practice of law began in 1873 with the
advent of the industrialization of the United States. EARLE, supra note 67, at 28-29. Of course,
that was also the year in which the firm of Shearman & Sterling was founded. /d. at 23. David
Dudley Field's biographer Daun van Ee also suggested that ihe change in the practice of law
occurred about 1870. VAN EE, supra note 54, at 218-19,290. It was around this time that Field
represented Jim Fisk and Jay Gould in the infamous Erie Railroad takeover battles. See id. at
221-31.
82. With a great deal of clarity, Professor Robert Gordon has explained the impact of railroad
reorganization work on the practice of elite lawyers . See Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal
Practice, supra note 45, at 101-09. An early criticism of the inefficiency of railroad
reorganization, and the role played by lawyers in fostering this inefficiency is SAMUEL
UNTERMYER, THE LAWYER-CITIZEN-HIS ENLARGING RESPONSffiiLITIES 15-24 (1916) (address
at the July 27, 1916 meeting of the Commercial Law League).
83 . Paul D. Cravath, The Reorganization of Corporations; Bondholders' and Stockholders'
Protective Committees; Reorganization Committees; and the Voluntary Recapitalization of
Corporations, Lecture Before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Mar. 1 & 8,
1916), in SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION
153, 211-12 (1917).
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in my view, helped change the practice of the elite lawyer.
But there was also another reason: the growth of law schools and law
graduates. From 1870, when Langdell arrived at Harvard Law School, to
1890, the number of law schools nearly doubled, from thirty-one to sixtyone. 84 By 1910, the number of law schools had more than doubled again, to
124. 85 The number of law students enrolled in law schools increased from
1,653 in 1870 to 19,567 by 1910. 86 This massive rise in the number of law
students, as demonstrated by Jerold Auerbach, 87 included a large number of
post-Civil War immigrants, particularly Jews and Catholics whose parents (or
who themselves) had emigrated from southern and eastern Europe.
At the same time that office practice became particularly lucrative, the
number of lawyers increased dramatically, particularly in New York City,
where elite lawyers were concentrated. The professional ethos would not
permit elite lawyers to justify the shift in the practice of law solely for the
reason that office practice paid better. 88 Instead, the argument for corporate
practice as the leading form of practice was made for reasons of knowledge.
Trial work came to be seen as beneath the level of professional complexity
involved in corporate counselling. Elite corporate lawyers and their successors
justified the transition on the basis that more knowledge of law was involved
in corporate counselling than in trial work. Most trial lawyers were
"unprofessional," relying on their relationships with judges (a nod to the
history of judicial corruption in New York) and obtaining work by peddling
their licenses to "practice" law. Lurking behind this professional excuse was
a class-based justification to separate office from trial lawyers. There were,
then, ideological justifications for the shift.
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, however, some elite
lawyers trained in the art of advocacy refused to accept this portrayal of the
court lawyer. Instead of accepting as a given the greater legal complexity of
corporate practice as compared with advocacy, these older elite lawyers
contended that the art of advocacy was more difficult than office practice. 89

84. WAYNE K. HOBSON, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL
SOCIETY, 1890-1930 at 108 tbl. 1 (1986) .
85. /d.
86. /d.
87. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 50, 119-29 (1976) .
88 . Walter Earle's history of Shearman & Sterling allows that one of the reasons for the firm's
tum to corporation law was monetary, but this reason was listed as the last of three reasons.
EARLE, supra note 67, at 36 ("Besides, corporation law was becoming more interesting, more
important, and more remunerative.") . Even after World War II, apologists for the large law firm
downplayed the relationship between wealth and the practice of law in a large law firm. See
DEAN, supra note 46, at 86-87; LEVY, supra note 46, at 166-69; HARRISON TwEED, THE
CHANGING PRACTICE OF LAW 10 (1955).
89.
The successful lawyer is, at present, viewed from the standpoint of commercial
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It was not until the 1920s that office practice came to be accepted as the
"leading" form of legal practice. Its acceptance as such, however, led to a
greater acceptance of the professionalism of the legal specialist.
The dichotomy between the work and position of the office lawyer and the
advocate was enormous. The advocate was a public figure, practicing his art
in the courtroom for juries, reporters and the general public; office lawyers
were anonymous figures engaged in activities in the privacy of their offices.
The advocate attracted business by making a reputation for himself in
notorious cases drawing public attention; the office lawyer attracted business
by directing public or governmental attention to anyone other than his client.
The advocate, at least the plaintiffs attorney, represented most of his clients
for one case only; the office lawyer might represent one client in a number of
legal matters. The advocate represented an individualistic ethos; the office
lawyer, as a member of a law firm, represented a collective ethos. 90
Some changes to the work of lawyers were accepted readily. The
absorption of conveyancing work by title companies was defended on
efficiency grounds. 91 The deposing of the trial lawyer from the pinnacle of
the profession, on the other hand, was resisted for reasons which today would
be regarded as professionalism reasons. The office lawyer was attacked for
lacking both independence from his client and knowledge of law.

B. The Business of Lawyers: 1900-1945
An article in the 1901 Yale Law Journal by a San Francisco lawyer named
George Shelton set in relief the fear, as his title made clear, of Law as a
Business. 92 To Shelton, one cause of the decline of the profession of law was

shrewdness and a large professional income. The measure of his professional worth
is his dollar-producing value. If this is the criterion of success, the business lawyer
is undoubtedly successful , but he is not the great lawyer. His reward is pecuniary;
that of his brother in the Courts is found in the estimation of his professional ability
and skill by his brethren of the Bar, and an appreciative public . The business of the
Court lawyer calls for intellectual capacity of a high order, developed by assiduous
study of the law as a science, and by literary culture. That of the business lawyer is,
to a large extent, commercial.
STRONG, supra note 44, at 127-28.
90. The biographies of the great advocates are all histories of the lawyers, not their firms .
Conversely, the "biographies" of the founders of the large corporate law firms are more histories
of the firms than biographies of the founders .
91. See George W. Bristol, The Passing of the Legal Profession, 22 YALE L.J. 590, 590-92
(1913); Robert T. Platt, The Decadence of Law as a Profession and Its Growth as a Business,
12 YALE L.J. 441, 442-44 (1903) ; COHEN, supra note 46, at 269-70. There was less joy,
particularly by elite lawyers, about the creation of trust companies to handle work formerly
monopolized by lawyers .
92 . Shelton, supra note 24 .
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that "with the advent of the business lawyer has come also greed of gain as the
prime incentive to professional activity. " 93 He also complained, "The
mercenary spirit which governs the practice has made the contingent fee a
legitimate source of income. The lawyer becomes the litigant himself. " 94
Shelton felt that contingent fees compromised the integrity of the attorney. 95
Furthermore, Shelton believed that the results of the rise of the large law firm
were "the gradual decline of the country practitioner as an influential
factor, " 96 and the disappearance of the independent lawyer. 97
Seven years later, the Yale Law Journal published an article, written by
Champ Andrews, echoing that same theme. Titled The Law-A Business or
a Profession?, 98 this tale of a conversation among a judge, a successful
lawyer, and the lawyer's law student son argued the debasement of law from
a profession to a business. Andrews suggested that, "[n]owadays the bigger
the lawyer, the more he becomes the clerk, the hired man of the business
man. " 99
Another attack on the commercialization of the profession is found in The
American Lawyer: As He Was-As He Is-As He Can Be, a book by John R.
For the 63-year-old author, organizer of the Sugar
Dos Passos. 100
Trust, 101 the decline in the profession of law was closely connected to the
change in the calling of the lawyer from advocate to office lawyer. The
profitability of office practice, and the involvement of lawyers in the business
affairs of corporate clients, utterly changed the legal profession. Dos Passos,
like Shelton and Andrews, charged that "law has become a business." 102

93. Id. at 277.
94 . Id. at 279.
95. See id. at 279-80.
96. Id. at 280.
97. Id. at 281-82.
98 . ChampS. Andrews, The Law-A Business or a Profession?, 17 YALE L.J . 602 (1908) .
99. ld. at 608.
100. JOHN R. DOS PASSOS, THE AMERICAN LAWYER: AS HE WAS-As HE Is-As HE CAN
BE (1907).
101. Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual, supra note 45, at 58.
102. Dos PASSOS, supra note 100, at 46. A similar complaint heard before the tum of the
century is found in 2 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALrn 492 (spec . ed. Legal
Classics Library 1987) (1888):
But I am bound to add that some judicious American observers hold that the last
thirty years have witnessed a certain decadence in the Bar of the greater cities. They
say that the growth of enormously rich and powerful corporations, willing to pay vast
sums for questionable services, has seduced the virtue of some counsel whose
eminence makes their example important . . . .
One attempt to reinstill the ideals of the profession was the publication from 1907 to 1909
of Great American Lawyers, biographies of 96 deceased lawyers in eight volumes. The editor
was William Draper Lewis, Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, whose
progressive efforts in the ABA and whose work as first director of the American Law Institute

1024

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:1003

At a speech before Harvard University alumni in June 1905, President
Theodore Roosevelt prayed that businessmen and lawyers adopt lofty ideals in
public life. He charged:
We all know that, as things actually are, many of the most influential and
most highly remunerated members of the bar in every centre of wealth
make it their special task to work out bold and ingenious schemes by
which their very wealthy clients, individual or corporate, can evade the
laws which are made to regulate in the interest of the public the use of
great wealth. 103

Roosevelt suggested that instead of blindly adopting the interests of their
clients in evading the law, lawyers would better serve the public interest by
creating a spirit of respect for law to "shap[e] the growth of the national
soul. " 104
Roosevelt's speech struck a nerve in the profession; a second event struck
a nerve in the public. During the last half of 1905, in the Aldermanic
chamber of New York's City Hall, the Armstrong Committee, whose legal
counsel was a New York lawyer named Charles Evans Hughes, investigated
the scandal of the life insurance industry. The scandal began over the struggle
by some of the great fmanciers of the day, including George Gould, E. H.
Harriman, and Thomas F. Ryan, to take control over the Equitable Life
Insurance Company. 105 Shortly after beginning his investigation, Hughes
decided to investigate the entire life insurance industry. Hughes uncovered
self-dealing, the payment of outrageously high salaries to management,
dubious "investment" actions, a precipitous decline in dividends even when
profits skyrocketed, and the self-perpetuation in office of directors and
executives through the clever use of proxies. 106 From September through
the end of December, Hughes's investigation captivated the public's interest.
That there was a close connection between the insurance companies and elite

make him an interesting figure in the intellectual history of American law and the legal
profession. On Lewis, see generally Stephen Botein, William Draper Lewis, in DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY: SUPPLEMENT FOUR, 1946-1950, at 490 (John A. Garraty & Edward T.
James eds ., 1974).
103 . Theodore Roosevelt, Address at Harvard University (June 28, 1905), in 4 THEODORE
ROOSEVELT, PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES AND STATE PAPERS 407, 419-20 (1910).
104. /d. at 420.
105. See MORTON KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, 1885-1910: A STUDY IN THE
LIMITS OF CORPORATE POWER 245-64 (1963); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 94-95 (1963). For Hughes's
view of the Armstrong investigation, see AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF HUGHES, supra note 51,
at 121-27.
106. See KELLER, supra note 105, at 253; GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, supra
note 51, at 197-98 .
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corporate lawyers did not endear the profession to the public. 107
At the ABA's 1905 annual meeting, its President, Henry St. George
Tucker, used Roosevelt's speech as a catalyst to urge the Association to begin
work on a code of ethics. 108 The delegates charged a committee with
assessing the advisability of adopting a code of ethics. 109 At the ABA's next
annual meeting, the committee recommended the appointment of another
committee to draft such a code. 110 The primary sources used for these
canons of ethics were a series of lectures on legal ethics by a deceased
Pennsylvania judge named George Sharswood111 and Alabama's 1887 code
of ethics. The ABA in 1907 published Sharswood' s lectures as a volume of
its series of annual reports 112 and adopted a total of thirty-two Canons of
Professional Ethics at its 1908 annual meeting. 113
The 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics contained at least two efforts to
expunge "commercialism" from the legal profession: Canon 13, which
.concerned contingent fees , and Canon 27, which forbade lawyers to advertise.
Canon 13 was the only canon proposed by the Committee on Canons of Ethics
which was amended. As originally drafted, Canon 13 permitted contingent
fees only in carefully regulated situations: "Contingent fees may be contracted
for , but they lead to many abuses and should be under the supervision of the
court. " 114 A number of ABA members vociferously opposed proposed
Canon 13, defending contingent fee arrangements on both moral and
professional grounds. 115 Canon 13 was amended to permit lawyers a greater
flexibility in taking a fee contingent on an award from the jury .11 6
107.
The problem for the legal profession in this was exemplified by Root, who was
a director of Mutual Life . Though none of the revelations of the investigation
specifically implicated him in the scandals, nevertheless he had been part of a system
which the country condemned as dishonest and corrupting and which the state
legislature now set out to reform.
GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, supra note 51, at 198 .
108. See Henry S. Tucker, Address of the President at the 28th Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association (Aug. 23 , 1905), in 28 A.B.A. REP. 299, 383-88 (1905) (quoting
Roosevelt, supra note 103).
109. See Transactions ofthe 28th Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 28 A.B.A.
REP. 3, 132 (1905) .
110. See Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 29 A.B.A. REP. 600, 600
(pt. 1, 1906) .
111. On Sharswood , see generally Samuel Dickson, George Sharswood, in 6 GREAT
AMERICAN LAWYERS 123 {William D . Lewis ed ., 1909).
112. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 43 .
113. See Transactions of the 31st Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 33 A.B.A.
REP. 3, 86 {1908).
114. Transactions of the 31st Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 33 A.B.A.
REP. 3, 61 {1908) .
115. See id. at 62-75 .
116. In its final version, Canon 13 read: "Contingent fees , where sanctioned by law, should
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Professor Jerold Auerbach has argued that the attack on the contingent fee
was a class-based attack. In his telling, "[n]othing plunged the professional
elite deeper into despair than contingent fees and the proliferation of
negligence lawyers whose practice depended upon them. " 117 I accept that
the elite were overly concerned with the encampment of "negligence" lawyers
in the legal profession; however, Auerbach's history ignores the professionalism crisis created by the contingent fee. For many lawyers supporting the
adopting of a code of ethics, the issue of contingent fees was at least as much
about professional independence as about the exclusion of Jews (or Catholics
or others) from the legal profession.
The regulation of contingent fees in the ABA's Canons of Professional
Ethics was a classic effort of progressive reformers. Like many progressive
reforms, the Canons presented a number of conservative features. Yet the
idea behind them was classically progressive because it attempted to create, in
lawyers, a shield between the market and the system of justice. Today, the
attempt in the early 1900s to regulate contingent fee agreements can be
critiqued from either the right or the left. The attack from the right is that the
market for contingent fee arrangements will solve most (and maybe all)
inequities, and the attack from the left is, as Auerbach has argued, that the
attempt to regulate contingent fee arrangements protects the economic interests
of the proprietary class alone and attempts to maintain an ethnically pure legal
profession. Although each argument contains some truth, both critiques fail
to consider the desire of progressives to raise professional standards,
bureaucratize institutions, and regulate economic markets. There was more
than a touch of prejudice on the part of many elite lawyers; more crucial,
however, is that the lawyer's claim to professionalism was premised at least
partly on his independence, and a failure to regulate contingent fee contracts
affected the profession's claim to independence.
Attacks on the unprofessionalism of contingent fees were not new.
Sharswood's 1854 Essay on Professional Ethics acknowledged the legality of
contingent fees, but attacked them as ethically improper. Sharswood wrote:
It is to be observed, then, that such a contract changes entirely the relation
of counsel to the cause. It reduces him from his high position of an officer
of the court and a minister of justice, to that of a party litigating his own
claim. Having now a deep personal interest in the event of the controversy, he will cease to consider himself subject to the ordinary rules of
professional conduct. 118

be under the supervision of the Court, in order that clients may be protected from unjust
charges." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 13 (1908) .
117. AUERBACH, supra note 87, at 45 .
118. SHARSWOOD, supra note 43, at 160. Sharswood's entire discussion of contingent fees is
found in id. at 153-64.
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George Shelton's attack on the commercialism of the profession primarily
attacked the business lawyer and secondarily attacked the contingent fee
arrangement. 119 Julius Henry Cohen's 1916 attack on the commercialization
of the legal profession includes a strong criticism of the contingent fee
arrangement, but his attack was less upon the availability of the arrangement
than upon its unregulated use. Like Sharswood, Cohen believed that the
contingent fee made the lawyer a principal in the litigation, clouded his
judgment, and made him a speculator in lawsuits. 120 This did not mean that
the arrangement was to be outlawed, for Cohen admitted, "[W]here the client
is poor, this is perhaps the only way by which he may get adequate professional assistance. " 121 The real issue was the lawyer's independence, for
Cohen claimed: "Yet every practitioner knows that the contingent fee
arrangement is more often a convenience for the rich to join with a lawyer in
speculation over the results of a lawsuit." 122
The contingent fee arrangement was a side issue for both Shelton and
Cohen. To Cohen, writing after the adoption of the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, the main issue concerning the commercialization of the practice
of law was the solicitation of clients, prohibited by Canon 27. In Cohen's
view, once solicitation was permitted, the answer to the question posed by his
book's title, The Law: Business or Profession?, was "business." Solicitation
made law a trade, not a profession, and turned one's clients into customers.
Not only did solicitation lead to the lawyer's dependence upon the client, it
turned the lawyer from the ideals of disinterested service to the pursuit of
wealth.
The first specific charge connecting legal specialization with the
commercialization of the profession came in 1910. New Jersey gubernatorial
candidate Woodrow Wilson gave the annual address at the ABA's annual
meeting that year. Wilson's speech was titled The Lawyer and the Community. 123 Wilson began with the assertion that the whole history of society was

119. Shelton, supra note 24, at 279-80 .
120. COHEN, supra note 46, at 209-10.
121. ld. at 209. A similar statement is in SHARSWOOD, supra note 43, at 154:
For a poor man, who is unable to pay at all, there may be a general understanding
that the attorney is to be liberally compensated in case of success. What is objected
to, is an agreement to receive a certain part or proportion of the sum or subjectmatter, in the event of a recovery, and nothing otherwise.
122. COHEN, supra note 46, at 210. Whether or not this was true, Cohen's language makes
clear that justifications of regulation of contingent fees necessarily were made on the basis of
professionalism, not for economic or class reasons. A recent criticism of the inefficiency of the
contingent fee is contained in BOK, supra note 31, at 141-44. To see Bok use arguments
progressive reformers have used since at least the turn of the century is striking, but it should not
be considered surprising.
123. See Woodrow Wilson, The Lawyer and the Community, Address at the 33d Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association (Aug. 31, 1910), in 35 A.B .A. REP. 419 (1910) ,
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a struggle for law. 124 After spending some effort to prove this point, he then
made the traditional knowledge-based claim of lawyers to authority: "We are
lawyers. This is the field of our knowledge . We are servants of society,
officers of the courts of justice. " 125 But this was not how the profession acted. 126 Wilson then made the connection:
A new type of lawyers has been created; and that new type has come
to be the prevailing type. Lawyers have been sucked into the maelstrom
of the new business system of the country. That system is highly technical
and highly specialized. It is divided into distinct sections and provinces,
each with particular legal problems of its own. Lawyers, therefore,
everywhere that business has thickened and had a large development, have
become experts in some special technical field . They do not practise law.
They do not handle the general, miscellaneous interests of society. They
are not general counsellors of right and obligation. They do not bear the
relation to the business of their neighborhoods that the family doctor bears
to the health of the community in which he lives. The [sic] do not concern
themselves with the universal aspects of society. The family doctor is
himself giving place to a score of specialists; and so is also what one might
call the family solicitor. Lawyers are specialists, like all other men around
them. The general, broad, universal field of law grows dim and yet more
dim to their apprehension as they spend year after year in minute
examination and analysis of a particular part of it; not a small part, it may
be, perhaps the part which the courts are for the time most concerned
with, but a part which has undergone a high degree of development, which
is very technical and many-sided, and which requires the study and
practice of years for its mastery; and yet a province apart, whose conquest
necessarily absorbs them and necessarily separates them from the
dwindling body of general practitioners who used to be our statesmen. 127
Wilson's solution was that lawyers remember the ideal of service to which
they were all called. The ideal of service necessitated that lawyers remain
attuned to the general interest of the country. Specialization led to expert
counselling of special interests, and the greatest special interest facing the
country was the interest of the corporation, aided by the "corporation lawyer,"
in circumventing the law. 128 Specialization, then, was incompatible with the
ideal of service, and incompatible with the definition of professionalism.
Printed immediately after Wilson's speech in the ABA's Annual Report

reprinted in Woodrow Wilson, The Lawyer and the Community, 192 N. AM. REV. 604 (1910).
124. Id. at 419.
125. ld. at 421.
126. See id. at 423 .
127. ld. at 424-25 .
128. See id. at 426-35 .
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is a paper by Charles W. Moores discussing the legal practice of Abraham
Lincoln, the symbol of the country lawyer. 129 Lincoln was the type of
lawyer held out to the public (and the profession) as embodying the best traits
of the profession. 130 He practiced law in the traditional manner, representing clients in all kinds of legal matters, and representing any clients who came
to him. He refused to let the passions of the community determine the vigor
of his defense of one who was criminally accused, and he remained an
independent lawyer who knew the whole field of law.
The internal crisis faced by the legal profession during the 1910s involved
issues both of independence and of knowledge. Further, these issues were
found in bold relief at both ends of the legal profession. The elite lawyer, as
a specialist representing the interests of his corporate master, appeared to lack
both the breadth of knowledge and independence expected of the lawyer. The
negligence lawyer, whose knowledge of law was suspect, proliferated as the
number of unregulated law schools increased. With the elite lawyer, little was
attempted to remedy this lack of professionalism. 131 Dealing with the
negligence lawyer was another matter.
An emerging professional class of law professors at the "national" law
schools 132 believed that night and part-time law schools provided an insufficient professional education and that the students enrolled in these schools
should not enter the profession. 133 In 1913, the ABA's Committee on Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar requested the Carnegie Foundation for
the Advancement of Teaching to investigate legal education. 134 The Founda-

129. See Moores, supra note 16. The Director of the Lincoln Legal Papers Project also has
claimed that Lincoln would take any clients who requested his services and has called him "the
ultimate general practitioner." Cameron McWhirter, Unveiling the Mystery of Lincoln's Early
Years, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 3, 1993, at 1-L, 5-L.
130. Indeed, Alfred Hemenway called Lincoln "a typical American lawyer. " Hemenway,
supra note 46, at 400-01.
131. However, blatant conflicts of interest were frowned on. In 1921, the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York laid charges against elite lawyer Thomas Chadbourne. The
accusations were (1) that Chadbourne, while representing George Gould, the executor of Jay
Gould's will, failed to inform the court of improprieties that he knew George Gould to have
committed as executor, and (2) that Chadbourne had represented both George Gould and the
·Missouri Pacific Railroad when Gould tried to take over the railroad. The Grievance Committee
of the Association found a basis in the charges and took Chadbourne to court, but the Appellate
Division later acquitted Chadbourne. See GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, supra note
51 , at 368-70; THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS CHADBOURNE, supra note 59, at 87-94.
132. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Enmity and Amity: Law Teachers and Practitioners, 1900-1922,
in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 551 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971); John H.
Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal Realists: The Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J . LEGAL Eouc. 311 (1985) .
133. See Auerbach, supra note 132, at 575-80.
134. See Transactions of the 36th Annual Meeting ofthe American Bar Association, 38 A.B.A.
REP. 5, 25 (1913).
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tion agreed to fund a study of legal education directed by a nonlaWYer named
Alfred Z. Reed.
A decade earlier, the Foundation inquired about funding a study of legal
education and was rebuffed by the ABA. The Foundation then turned to a
study, under the direction of Abraham Flexner, of American medical
education. The result of this study, widely known as the Flexner Report, was
published in 1910. 135 The Flexner Report was credited with enhancing the
prestige of the medical profession and the future care of patients by increasing
the standards of medical education. One apparent consequence of the Flexner
Report was a radical reduction of the number of medical schools and medical
students, although one historian of American medicine believes that such a
view misstates the role of the Flexner Report. 136
When the Foundation agreed to investigate the state of legal education in
1913, it was the hope of the elite of the legal profession that this report would
have the same impact on legal education as they believed the Flexner Report
had had on medical education. Due in part to the intervention of World War
I, and in part to Reed's petulance at having his work upstaged by Reginald
Heber Smith's book Justice and the Poor, 131 Reed's report was not published
until 1921.
Even seventy-plus years after its publication, Reed's report, Training for
the Public Profession of the Law, 138 is an amazing document. Reed's report
was propelled by two ideas: first, that the profession of law was a public
profession; and second, that a unitary bar not only did not exist, it could not
exist.
As members of a public profession, laWYers provided services to the
community in which they lived and were also part of the "governing
mechanism of the state. " 139 As such, the laWYer functioned in a broadly

135 . ABRAHAM FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (191 0).
136. "[C]hanging economic realities, rather than the Flexner report, were what killed so many
medical schools in the years after 1906." PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE 118 (1982) .
137. See ROBERT B. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850s TO THE 1980s 115 (1983) .
138 . REED , supra note 41.
139. REED, supra note 41 , at 3. A recent history of legal education by Professor Paul
Carrington shares Reed 's conclusion about the public or political nature of the legal profession,
while disagreeing with his conclusion about the unattainability of a unitary bar. See Paul D.
Carrington, One Law: The Role of Legal Education in the Opening of the Legal Profession Since
1776, 44 FLA. L. REv. 501 (1992) . Carrington wrote:
[Most Jaw teachers] have supposed . .. that the enduring health of our democratic
legal institutions depended on sharing the legal profession as broadly as possible. At
the same time, . .. they have been generally right in insisting that those who share
the profession should recognize the unity of the common professional enterprise: one
Jaw, one profession whose work is informed by common values, with a shared duty
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political manner. Lawyers were political not simply in the sense of providing
society with many of its legislators and most of its judges; they were political
because "private individuals cannot secure justice without the aid of a special
professional order to represent and to advise them." 140 According to Reed,
that was the reason lawyers were officers of the court.
Regarding the unitary bar, Reed concluded, "The evil-the very great
evil-of the present situation, as a result of which all part-time legal education
now rests under a justified cloud, lies in the perpetuation of the theory of a
unitary bar, whose attainments are to be tested by uniform examinations. " 141
In Reed's view, there was no such thing as a unitary bar or "'a' standard
lawyer." 142 The bar was widely differentiated, based in large part on the
educational background of the lawyer. The fiction of a unitary bar caused the
differing types of law schools to attempt to hinder each other's development
rather than prepare their own students for the various kinds of legal practice
awaiting the graduates of each type of law school.
Because the unitary bar was unattainable, Reed concluded that night or
part-time law school programs of education should not be abolished. As a
public profession, "the interests . . . of the community demand that participation in the making and administration of the law shall be kept accessible to
Lincoln's plain people." 143 Instead of continuing to strive for the unattainable, Reed proposed formal recognition of a stratified bar based both upon the
type of legal education the lawyer received and, possibly, the lawyer's
functions in the community. 144
Reed implicitly accepted two premises of the differences between the elite
and nonelite practitioners. First, he accepted the inevitability of legal
specialization: One reason for formal recognition of a differentiated bar was
that "[t]he task of preparing students to engage in the general practice of the
law has now become a very difficult one. " 145 Second, he assumed that only
nonelite lawyers were advocates, or trial lawyers, stating, "Conveyancing,
probate practice, criminal law and trial work are examples of topics that seem
particularly appropriate for the relatively superficial schools. " 146
Unlike the rest of his report, Reed's statements about the reality of the

to one public .
Id. at 603.
140. REED, supra note 41, at 3.
141. ld. at 57.
142. ld.
143. Id. at 418 .
144. See id. at 237-39.
145. ld. at 419.
146. Id. at 419. This was a qualified assessment only, for Reed noted , "All this is mere
guesswork . ... , " id., and also suggested that stratification might be based on "the economic
status of the client," id.
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differentiated bar were quite conclusory, and, by his own admission, his
predictions about the work of different types of lawyers amounted to
guesswork. By premising his recommendations on the idea of a differentiated
bar, Reed touched an exposed nerve of the profession. For at least forty
years, the goal of bar leaders and legal academics was to increase professional
knowledge in order to enhance the authority of the profession. Raising the
educational standards among all law schools offered the best opportunity to
increase professional knowledge. Those devoted to raising educational
standards believed that Reed's insistence that a place be kept for "superficial"
law schools-and, of course, for "superficially" trained lawyers-would result
in a lessening of professionalism. 147
By 1921, the large 148 law firm was a set piece in the professional
landscape. However, the profession was still unable to fit specialization
comfortably within the concept of professionalism. Reed's willingness to let
local law schools teach their students conveyancing, probate, criminal law,
and, most importantly, trial work was based on the unstated premises that the
professional hierarchy began with corporate work, that the elite lawyer was not
an advocate, and that the elite and nonelite lawyers resided in at least two
different legal worlds. Although Reed believed that he was stating the
obvious, he was also striking (possibly inadvertently) in at least three ways at
the two pillars of the profession: knowledge and independence. First, Reed's
proposal that the profession be formally realigned contemplated that the idea
of law as a science could be limited only to some (read "elite") lawyers. For
the nonelite lawyer, law was not a science. Second, Reed categorized "law"
based on the lawyer's type of practice. In his scheme, a lawyer's knowledge
would not be of all of "law," but only some of it. Third, any Reed-inspired
attempt to offer part-time and night law schools a better chance to survive
threatened the independence of lawyers by creating an oversupply, particularly
an oversupply of lawyers who were deemed "unfit."
Training for the Public Profession of the Law was not published until
August 1921. In 1920, legal academics at the most prestigious law schools
attended the meeting of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar at the 1920 ABA convention and forced the creation of a Special
Committee on Legal Education. 149 At the July 1921 meeting, that committee, whose chairman was the eminence grise of the legal profession, Elihu

147. There was always the fear of a neo-Jacksonian outburst, recalling a time during which
egalitarianism overrode any concern for standards . Coursing through this quest for standards,
of course, was prejudice.
148. "Large" in 1921 is very small by today's standards . See Wayne K. Hobson, Symbol of
the New Profession: Emergence of the Large Law Firm, 1870-1915, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS,
supra note 45, at 3, 5.
149. See Proceedings of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, 45 A.B.A.
REP. 465 (1920) .
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Root, reported its fmdings. The Root Committee concluded that legal
education was adequately undertaken only in law schools. It proposed both
increasing educational requirements before entering law school from a high
school diploma to successful completion of two years of college and making
the bar examination a prerequisite to the practice of law. tso These proposals
ensured that all graduates of law schools were competent to practice law.
By engaging in "guesswork" regarding the functions of the differentiated
bars, Reed left himself open to criticism of his entire claim that there was no
such thing as a unitary bar. 1s1 Anticipating the Reed Report, 1s2 the Root
Committee further claimed that the legal profession was indeed a unified
profession. The Committee's report was adopted by the ABA, and it was later
used to persuade state and local bar associations and examiners to raise
standards for admissions to the bar.
The elite of the profession widely rejected Reed's report. The intensity
of the drive to maintain an outward unity in the legal profession led to
increasing interest in bar admissions as a gatekeeper to the profession. Both
legal educators and bar examiners worked to provide a semblance of a legal
canon. Although it held no formal status as an accrediting agency, in 1923 the
ABA began certifying law schools as being in compliance with its new,
uniform standards. It also successfully promoted stricter evaluations of bar
applicants by state bar examining authorities.m Finally, also in 1923, the
elite of the profession organized the American Law Institute, dedicated to
formulating a restatement of the law. 1s4

150. See Report of the Special Committee to the Section of Legal Education and Admissions
to the Bar of the American Bar Association, 46 A.B .A. REP. 679 (1921).
151. Albert Kales, a legal academic, made just such an attack. See Albert Kales, 35 HARV.

L. REv. 96, 97-98 (1921) (book review) . After setting forth Reed's opinion of a differentiated
bar, Kales wrote:
Such an analysis of our present situation and such a program for emphasizing it in the
future cannot be too severely condemned . It is superficial. It is false . It is impolitic ..
It can only end in disaster to the graduates of university law schools and, therefore,
disaster to the university law schools themselves ... . Successful lawyers do serve
the rich. They are far from leaders of the first rank, however, unless they maintain
so independent a position in the community that any interest feels safe in employing
them. Witness Mr. Hughes' employment by the miners in the Indianapolis cases .
Id. at 98 . For Reed ' s somewhat evasive response, see Alfred Z. Reed, Scholarship or Opinion?,
35 HARV. L. REV. 355 (1922).
152. According to Susan K. Boyd, the official historian of the ABA Section of Legal Education
and Admissions to the Bar, "[t]he Root Committee was given advance copies of Reed's book."
SUSAN K. BOYD, THE ABA'S FIRSf SECTION : AssURING A QUALIFIED BAR 26 (1993).
153 . In addition to organizing, in January 1922, a Special Conference on Legal Education, id.
at 24, the ABA Section of Legal Education sponsored , in 1931, the creation of the National
Conference of Bar Examiners, id. at 37.
154. A history of the origins of the American Law Institute is found in N.E.H . Hull,
Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 L.
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Unlike the flrst two decades of the century, when prominent lawyers
sounded a call to prevent law from becoming a business, the opposition to the
methods and efficiencies of "business" all but disappeared in the 1920s.m
In 1924, Felix Frankfurter wrote his friend, large-flrm lawyer Charles C.
Burlingham: "Don't you think it would be like a breath of fresh air in our
dank national atmosphere if a few lawyers who did matter would say we don't
like all this degradation and enveloping commercialism and general corrupting
atmosphere?" 156 When John W. Davis's name was floated for the Democratic nomination for President in 1924, Frankfurter wrote in several unsigned
editorials in The New Republic 151 that Davis was an "employe of Big
Business" 158 and concluded, "Latterly clients have had lawyers and not
Despite Frankfurter's warnings, for the brightest
lawyers clients. " 159
Harvard Law School graduates of the 1920s, the pinnacle of the legal
profession became the private practice of law on Wall Street. 160 In a May
1921 speech given to students at Boston University Law School, Chief Justice
Taft urged newly graduated lawyers t~ avoid losing their independence and
identity and not practice law solely in behalf of corporations. 161 Taft
condemned the fact that "[a]ble lawyers have yielded to the inducement of
large salaries and embraced exclusively the cause of large corporations. " 162
By the end of the decade, specialization was entrenched in the large law
flrm. 163 This realization also was flrst recognized, in a slight fashion, in the
amended Canons of Professional Ethics. The original Canons made no
mention of specialization or restriction of practice. A lawyer knew law. This
statement is reflected in the appraisal of Emory Buckner by his good friend
Felix Frankfurter. When Felix Frankfurter was asked to recommend a lawyer
to handle a complex admiralty case, Frankfurter responded: "'Get Emory
Buckner-he's the best trial lawyer in New York. That makes him the best

& HIST. REv. 55 (1990).

I have discussed the intellectual influence of the American Law
Institute' s work on the codification of evidence in Michael Ariens, Progress Is Our Only Product:
Legal Reform and the Codification of Evidence, 17 LAW & Soc. INQ. 213 (1992).
155. The information in this paragraph is taken from AUERBACH, supra note 87, at 130-57.
Not all opposition vanished, however. In 1924, Julius Henry Cohen revised and reissued his
1916 cautionary discussion of the dangers of commercialism, The Law: Business or Profession?.
156. Felix Frankfurter, Letter to Charles C . Burlingham (Feb. 14, 1924), quoted in
AUERBACH, supra note 87, at 139.
157. AUERBACH, supra note 87, at 139, attributes the editorials to Frankfurter.
158 . John W. Davis, 39 NEW REPUBLIC 224, 225 (1924).
159. Why Mr. Davis Shouldn't Run , 38 NEW REPUBLIC 193, 193 (1924).
160. See AUERBACH, supra note 87, at 140.
161 . William H. Taft, Legal Ethics , Address Before the Boston University Law School (May
9, 1921), in 1 B.U . L . REv. 233, 242-44 (1923).
162. /d. at 244.
163 . See HOBSON, supra note 84, at 402-03 .
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admiralty lawyer, even if he's never had an admiralty case. "' 164
The first formal recognition of the advance of legal specialization was the
adoption by the ABA of Canon 45 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Added to the Canons of Ethics in 1928, it declared that "specialists" were not
exempt from the principles of the Canons. 165 Five years later, the ABA first
acknowledged the professional and economic value of specialization by
adopting Canon 46 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Canon 46 formally
permitted lawyers undertaking specialized legal work exclusively for other
lawyers to advertise such specialized legal work in a "dignified" manner in
legal periodicals. 166
The 1920s, not surprisingly, was the decade in which corporate lawyers
were accepted at the top of the legal profession. Many of the law firms
created by first-generation business lawyers were reorganized. John Davis
reorganized the law firm created by J. P. Morgan's counsel Francis Lynde
Stetson into the firm known today as Davis, Polk and Wardwell. 167 In the
mid-1920s, the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell was reorganized, and John
Foster Dulles became one of its managing directors. 168 The law firm of
Shearman & Sterling grew greatly after a merger in 1918 with the firm of
Cary & Carroll. 169 The firm of Root, Clark, Buckner & Howland, consisting of six lawyers (including, as counsel, Elihu Root) at the beginning of
1919, 170 consisted of more than thirty lawyers by the end of 1920, 171 and
thirty-nine by 1922. 172
The growth of the large law firm was phenomenal. Professor Wayne
Hobson has noted that between 1915 and 1924, the number of major law firms
in five American cities grew markedly in number and size. 173 In 1915,
Hobson counted twenty-seven major firms containing 237 lawyers; nine years
later, there were 101 major firms containing 1,303 lawyers. 174 In 1929,
James Grafton Rogers wrote about the historical development of the American
lawyer. 175 Calling the model modem lawyer a "business lawyer, " Rogers

164. MARTIN MAYER, EMORY BUCKNER 1 (1968) (quoting Felix Frankfurter) .
165. See Canons of Professional Ethics, 53 A.B.A. REP. 769, 769 n. *, 781 (1928) .
166. See Canons of Professional Ethics , 58 A.B.A. REP. 697, 709 (1933) .
167. See HARBAUGH, supra note 70, at 251-55 .
168 . See LISAGOR & LIPSIUS, supra note 71, at 100-01.
169. EARLE, supra note 67, at 205-07 (noting that the merger was effective January 1, 1919).
170. MAYER, supra note 164, at 126.
171. Id. at 127.
172. GERALD T. DUNNE, GRENVILLE CLARK: PuBLIC CITIZEN 47 (1986) .
173. The cities studied were New York, Chicago, Boston, Cleveland, and Kansas City .
Hobson, supra note 148, at 5.
174. See id.
175. James G. Rogers , Types of the American Lawyer, Past and Present, 15 A.B.A. J. 531 ,
534 (1929) .
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stated, "Today this model represents the ambition of most young men, the
standard of greatest achievement. " 176 Three years later, Rogers wrote
American Bar Leaders, biographical essays of the presidents of the ABA
during its first fifty years. In his foreword, Rogers spoke confidently of "the
march on and off the stage in tum of the soldier-lawyer, the orator or
advocate, the 'railroad lawyer,' the 'trust-buster,' the 'business lawyer,' and
the entry at last of the international lawyer on the scene. " 177 This inevitable
progression of the legal profession toward bigger and better seemed as natural
as the progression of the economic structure of American society.
The emergence of the corporate lawyer as a "leader" of the bar occurred
in part as a consequence of the assumption by second-generation business
lawyers of roles in bar associations and politics. 178 Both Charles Evans
Hughes and John W. Davis were nominated for President of the United States.
Elihu Root served as Secretary of State and Senator from the state of New
York. All three served as Presidents of' the ABA during its maturation as an
institution claiming to represent the American legal profession, and each also
served a term as President of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York. On the other hand, first-generation business lawyer John W. Sterling
never joined any bar association and never participated in any professional
activities or in public life. None of the name partners in the law firm
presently known as Cravath, Swaine and Moore ever served as President of
either the American or New York City bar associations. 179
It should not have been surprising that, in the midst of the Great
Depression, there was a reaction against the perceived excesses of large
corporations and their advisors, the corporate lawyers. During the 1930s, the
issue was neither whether the corporate lawyer represented the pinnacle of the
profession nor whether legal specialization existed; instead, the issue was
whether the corporate lawyer was properly undertaking his role as a
professional.
Two remarkable articles drawing attention to the connection between legal
specialization and commercialism were published in 1933. One was an essay,
titled Modem Legal Profession, written by Professor Adolf Berle for the

176. ld.
177. JAMES G. ROGERS, AMERICAN BAR LEADERS v (1932) . Essentially the same statement
is found in Rogers , supra note 175, at 534 .
178. Professor Samuel Haber, in his history of the professions, including the legal profession,
from 1750 to 1900, has noted that first-generation corporate lawyers were not bar association
leaders . See HABER, supra note 21 , at 212 (noting that corporate lawyers Francis Lynde Stetson
and James Dill were not leaders of the ABA) .
179. From 1905 to 1922, however, Edward Cairns Henderson was a name partner of the
Cravath firm. Although never President of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
he served a number of years as chairman of its library committee. See GEORGE MARTIN,
CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, supra note 51, at 336 .
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Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. 180 The other was a paper written by
Karl Llewellyn for The American Academy of Political and Social Science and
published under the title, The Bar Specializes- With What Results?. 181
Berle's article is a brilliant sociological dissection of the American legal
profession, particularly compared with the legal profession in civil-law
countries. Berle first noted that, though "[i]n theory all lawyers were
alike," 182 the American legal profession was hierarchically segregated on the
basis of function and size. 183 At the top was the law factory, the large law
firm which acted largely as business counsel; in the middle were lawyers
practicing in firms of from three to twenty members, who divided their work
among the courts, business, and politics; and at the bottom were the vast
majority of lawyers, practicing alone or in pairs, whose primary function was
to handle the affairs of individuals and small businesses. 184 It was the first
group, the business lawyers, which especially aroused Berle's ire.
The transformation of the economy at the end of the nineteenth century,
according to Berle, led to the transformation of the lawyer. 185 Instead of
protecting the rights of individuals from exploitation by private interests, the
business lawyer "became a virtual annex to some group of financial promoters,
manipulators or industrialists. " 186 The business lawyer had sacrificed his
independence for the monetary rewards of corporate practice, contributing only
"the creation of a legal framework for the economic system, built largely
around the modem corporation." 187 Berle noted, "The impression grew that
the lawyer existed to serve and not to counsel his clients. " 188 The modem
view of the lawyer as servant of the client justified the lawyer in using any
legal lever available to further the client's interests. The traditional view was
that the lawyer was an officer of the court, a counsellor of the client, and
consequently duty-bound to serve justice, even at the expense of his client's
interests. 189 The modem view, in Berle's opinion, was that the lawyer was

180. A.A. Berle, Jr., Modern Legal Profession, in 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 340 (Edwin R.A. Seligman et al. eds., 1933).
181. K.N. Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes-With What Results?, 167 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. SCI. 177 (1933). This paper was later republished in the Commercial Law
League's journal, the Commercial Law Journal. See K. N. Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes-With
What Results?, 39 CoM. L.J. 336 (1934).
182. Berle, supra note 180, at 340.
183 . ld. at 340-41.
184. Id. at 342.
185 . Id. at 341.
186. ld.
187. ld.
188. ld.
189. ld. at 343.
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"the paid servant of his client. " 190 To Berle, the "commercialization" of the
bar caused lawyers to abandon their traditional social functions of influencing
public life and law in America. 191 Instead of enabling the lawyer to act as
an independent influence for the public good, "the specialized learning of the
lawyer was his private stock in trade to be exploited for his private benefit. "192
Llewellyn began his paper with the observation that "[t]he most significant
fact about the modem metropolitan bar" was that it had "moved mass-wise out
of court work, out of a general practice akin to that of the family doctor, into
highly paid specialization in the service of large corporations. " 193 The
result, according to Llewellyn, was several-fold: "Those-who-have" were
represented exceedingly well; trial courts were deprived of the best lawyers,
who practiced law in their offices advising corporations; and the poor man's
case was left unserved. 194 The solution, according to Llewellyn, was for the
metropolitan bar association to establish offices in various parts of the city to
act as clearinghouses for the legal problems of the poor, providing those
persons with the names of several attorneys, each of whom would be willing
to provide the necessary legal services. 19S
Neither essay questioned the expertise or knowledge of the lawyer in the
law factory. As legal progressives, both Berle and Llewellyn were interested
in improving the quality of service provided by lawyers. Llewellyn readily
acknowledged that quality craftSmanship had been attained in the law factory.
Indeed, part of Llewellyn's acceptance of the increasing emphasis on
specialization in the practice of law was to equate specialized legal practice
with professionalism. Llewellyn's complaint was not with specialization, but
with the maldistribution of the work of lawyers. 196 Berle's broader com-

190. ld.
191. ld. at 34344.
192 . ld. at 344.
193 . Llewellyn, supra note 181, at 177 .

. 194. ld. at 179-80.
195. Id. at 180-81.
196. Llewellyn first made the complaint two years earlier, in a review of a book titled A
Lawyer Tells the Truth. Llewellyn wrote:
Let this be written large, for senior partners in law-factories to ponder on: Law
does not exist for corporation executives alone. It is not, even, for stockholders
alone, or those whose income tax can, under proper counselling, be cut. The courts,
especially, are for all citizens who have, or believe they have, rights of which their
own efforts fail to induce fulfillment. And the financial importance of a case turns
quite as much on the marginal utility of the sum in question to the litigant as it does
on the absolute size of the sum involved. Let this also be written on the walls:
making court services effective is not a matter of radicalism. Accepting the criterion
not of what in some Utopia ought to be, but of what our polity has for some centuries
professed, courts stand on one footing with the roads and parks, not with a "right to
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plaint was that this maldistribution was performed in the blind service of those
who wielded great economic power, to the exclusion of the public-service
model of the legal profession. Although both were leery of some aspects of
legal specialization, both saw specialization as creating advantages for the
proper practice of law.
llewellyn's call for a redistribution of legal resources was not heeded.
There was, however, a rise in complaints by the progressive press about the
trends in the practice of law. 197
One year later, in a speech dedicating the Law Quadrangle at the
University of Michigan, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone excoriated the corporate
lawyer for failing his public responsibility to the community:
The changed character of the lawyer's work has made it difficult for
him to contemplate his function in its new setting, to see himself and his
occupation in proper perspective. No longer does his list of clients
represent a cross section of society; no longer do his contacts make him
the typical representative and interpreter of his community. The demands
of practice are more continuous and exacting. He has less time for
reflection upon other than immediate professional undertakings. 198

The type of lawyer Stone attacked most fiercely was the corporate lawyer:
"The successful lawyer of our day more often than not is the proprietor or
general manager of a new type of factory, whose legal product is increasingly
the result of mass production methods. More and more the amount of his
income is the measure of professional success. " 199 Even so, Stone believed
that specialization was necessary, and, in raising the level of the lawyer's
proficiency and technical skill, a beneficial consequence of the change of the
role of the lawyer in the modem commercial and industrial society of the
United States. The harm was that a learned profession had become an
"obsequious servant of business, and [become] tainted .. . with the morals
and manners of the market place in its most anti-social manifestations. " 200
Because they were engaged in the highly specialized service of business and

work," a "right to bread" or a "right to shelter. " It is the business of the bar to see
that people have access to the courts, and to fair treatment in them.
Llewellyn, supra note 18, at 1217.
197. See Mitchell Dawson, Frankenstein, Inc., 19 AM. MERCURY 274 (1930); William M.
Downing, New York Lawyer, 91 ScRmNERS MAG. 23 (1932) ; John W. Harrington, The Big
Shops of the Law, 11 AM. MERCURY 143 (1927) ; Lundberg, supra note 18; Ferdinand Lundberg ,
The Legal Profession: A Social Phenomenon, 178 HARPER's MAG. 1 (1938); Ferdinand
Lundberg, The Priesthood of the Law, 178 HARPER's MAG. 515 (1939) .
198. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, Address at the Dedication of the
University of Michigan Law Quadrangle (June 15, 1934), in 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1934) .
199. Id.
200. Id. at 7.
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finance, modem leaders of the bar were both less well-rounded and less
independent than bar leaders of the past.
Instead of being pessimistic, however, Stone was optimistic that
specialization placed the bar in the position where "the possibilities of its
influence are almost beyond calculation. " 201 In Stone's view, it was necessary to reformulate the calling of the lawyer in light of the changes in modem
society. The goal of higher standards of conduct, a goal that could be
achieved in part by through the influence of legal academics and law schools,
would provide the bar with another opportunity to perform its duty to society.
The nonelite practitioner struggled greatly during the Great Depression.
While elite practitioners like John Foster Dulles and John W. Davis earned
enormous incomes, a large percentage of lawyers were barely eking out a
living. 202
Although specialization was ensconced in the large law firm, the nonelite
lawyer remained, in fact and in perception, a general practitioner. In 1937,
the ABA created a Special Committee on the Economic Condition of the Bar,
which collected and analyzed several extant surveys of the legal profession.
The Committee's conclusion concerning a survey of the legal profession in
Wisconsin was: "A general absence of specialization, a fairly miscellaneous
clientele, and a large amount of work in the fields of property, collections, and
torts, appear to be characteristic of the run of the bar. " 203 A survey by Yale
Law School Dean Charles Clark and Research Associate Emma Corstvet of
fifty lawyers practicing law in New Haven and Hartford tried to make a claim
for specialization not made by lawyers themselves. The respondents claimed
that they were not specialists and that specialization did not pay, but Clark and
Corstvet concluded that specialization "was more general than first believed,"
as long as specialization was defmed as a type of work undertaken more than
twenty percent of the time. 204
On March 1, 1941, the Seventh Annual Cincinnati Conference was held
in Cincinnati, Ohio. Titled Law and Lawyers in the Modem World, the
Conference was devoted to conditions of practice and efforts to make the
administration of justice more efficient and inexpensive. Among the speeches
was a talk about legal specialization by a lawyer named Walter Fisher. Fisher
first noted the "narrow judgment" argument: "It is true that specialization
tends to make men narrow, rather than broad, and that lawyers with breadth
of experience and point of view are greatly needed. "20S With that caution,

201. /d. at 9.
202. See SPECIAL COMM . ON THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N,
THE ECONOMICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 15 (1938).
203. /d. at 31.
204. Charles E. Clark & Emma Corstvet, The Lawyer and the Public: An A.A.L.S. Survey,
47 YALE L.J. 1272, 1288 (1938).
205 . Walter T. Fisher, Address at the Cincinnati Conference on Law and Lawyers in the
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Fisher then turned to the need and value of legal specialization, stating,
"Specialization has the advantage of permitting a specific task to be done better
and cheaper. " 206 In addition, Fisher opined that specialization would drive
out bad lawyers in favor of good lawyers. 207 Finally, Fisher predicted that
specialization was the future of the profession, claiming, "[U]nless the lawyer
specializes, the sphere of his usefulness is bound to dwindle. " 208 Fisher then
discussed the Chicago Lawyer Reference Plan, which allowed members of the
Chicago Bar Association to list themselves as specialists in one or more fields
of law. 209
At least one of the other panelists agreed with Fisher's prediction about
the need for, and utility of, legal specialization. 210 The concluding talk was
then given by future Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge, who said, "I shall
say only this: I agree with Mr. Fisher, not only that specialization is here, that
it is going to stay, but that it is bound to increase. That is simply because the
nature of our society and, therefore, the service the lawyer must render to it,
are going to continue becoming more highly specialized. That is as inevitable
as the further evolution of machines. " 211
Although none of the participants in the symposium disputed the future
importance of legal specialization, one intriguing fact was noted with little
comment and no explanation.
Most respondents to the Chicago Bar
Association's plan to provide a reference service requested that they be listed
as general practitioners, not as specialists. A total of 267 respondents listed
themselves as general practitioners. Only 160 lawyers claimed inclusion in
one or more of the seventeen categories of specialized law practice. Twentysix respondents listed themselves as specialists in real estate, the highest
number of self-proclaimed specialists in any field. 212
By the beginning of World War II, elite lawyers fully embraced
specialized legal practice. Progressive academics also accepted the necessity
and utility of legal specialization. On the other hand, nonelite practitioners
remained wedded to the concept of the country lawyer, or general practitioner.213

Modern World (Mar. 1, 1941), in 15 U. CIN . L. REV. 123, 158 (1941) .
206 . Jd. at 159.
207 . "Until something constructive is done to build up personal injury specialists, we can
expect courts and legislatures and the public to be tolerant of ambulance chasing and other
methods of which we disapprove." ld. at 160.
208 . ld.
209 . See id. at 160-63 .
210. See Lloyd K. Garrison, Address at the Cincinnati Conference on Law and Lawyers in the
Modern World (Mar. 1, 1941), in 15 U. CIN . L. REv. 166, 173 (1941).
211. Wiley Rutledge, Address at the Cincinnati Conference on Law and Lawyers in the
Modern World (Mar. 1, 1941), in 15 U. CIN . L. REV . 228, 236 (1941).
212 . Id. at 161.
213 . That the idea of the country lawyer as an ideal type remained important in the bar's
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C. The Administrative State and the Practice of Law: 1945-69
Shortly after the end of World War II, the American Law Institute,
together with the ABA, began a national program of continuing legal
education. 214 The project was an effort to ensure the professionalism of
lawyers by enhancing their knowledge of law. As the institutional bar worked
to increase professionalism by organizing continuing legal education programs,
commentators noted the fact of extensive legal specialization. In announcing
the reversal of its previously held opinion that professional announcements sent
to lawyers and nonlawyers which included a statement of legal specialization
were improper, the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York State
Bar Association reported that it "recognized that specialization of the Bar has
increased as specialization in every other field has increased, and felt that to
shut one's eyes to this obvious development was futile. "215 In 1949,
corporate lawyer Robert T. Swaine belatedly responded to progressive critics
of the 1930s and defended the large-firm lawyer's practice, including its
specialization, in the American Bar Association Journal. 216 That same year,
Fortune magazine proflled the American legal profession and noted that the
lawyers in the largest law firms were "highly specialized operator[s]. " 217
Beginning in 1950, the ABA began its efforts to formally recognize legal
specialization. The ABA appointed a special committee to determine whether
to amend Canon 27, which forbade nearly all forms of advertising, to permit
lawyers to place on their letterhead recognized specialties. 218 The next year,
despite prior adverse formal opinions from the Committee on Professional
Ethics, the ABA amended Canon 27 to allow admiralty and patent lawyers to
state their specialties on letterheads or shingles. 219 The stated reason of the
ABA's House of Delegates for creating the exception for admiralty and patent
lawyers was "that substantially the entire time of lawyers in these fields is
spent in their specialty, and that little or no practice by these specialized
lawyers is done in other fields . "220 A 1951 article in the American Bar

conception of itself may be indicated in John W. Davis' s perception of himself as a lawyer.
Jerold Auerbach has noted that Davis, the most visible symbol of the corporate lawyer during the
1920s, "diligently ... reiterated his pride that he was 'born and raised a country lawyer, and
a country lawyer, I suppose, I shall remain. " ' AUERBACH , supra note 87, at 137 (quoting John
W. Davis).
214. See generally PAUL A. WOLKIN, ALI-ABA XL! (1988) (discussing the history of
continuing legal education efforts of the American Law Institute and American Bar Association).
215 . Professional Announcements, 19 N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N . BULL. 152, 153 (1947).
216 . Swaine, supra note 81.
217 . The U.S. Bar, FORTUNE, May 1949, at 90, 172.
218. See Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 75 A.B.A. REP. 102, 122-23.
219. See Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 76 A.B.A. REP. 107, 123-24 (1951).
220. ld. at 124. The special committee which made the recommendation to the House of
Delegates relied largely on the history of such usages by admiralty and patent lawyers, dating
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Association Journal examining the organization of a lawyer's practice
suggested the necessity of specialization in all but the smallest offices in the
smallest towns. 221 In his President's Page column in the February 1953
issue of the Journal, Robert G. Storey announced the creation of a special
committee to advise the Board of Governors whether it should prescribe
minimum standards of education and experience to practice as a specialist.
Storey wrote:
The legal profession has not kept pace with the rapidly changing events
and demands of our time. Admission to the Bar is a license to a lawyer
to perform almost any legal operation that an unsuspecting client may
invite. The neophyte lawyer is automatically certified as competent to
advise a corporation on its tax liabilities, to draw oil unitization agreements, and to negotiate consent decrees in antitrust suits.
In thus providing for continuing legal education, the Bar and the law
school co-operating in the project do more than benefit lawyers who have
an ambition for greater knowledge . They benefit principally the public in
that the lawyers to whom problems are taken in special fields have
superior competence. As these specialists develop in the law, they are
being recognized by lawyers and by the public, and, to an increasing
extent, technical problems will be referred to technical legal experts for
solution. 222

The next year, the Special Committee on Specialization and Specialized
Legal Education recommended that the ABA create a permanent committee to
regulate specialization. The permanent committee would "encourage the
formation of groups of lawyer specialists in the approved fields of specialization. " 223 The Committee also recommended amending Canon 46 to permit
lawyers to send to other lawyers a brief, dignified notice of membership in a
specialty group. 224 At the ABA's 1954 Mid-year Meeting, the House of
Delegates refused to adopt the Committee's recommendations and substituted
vaguely worded recommendations supporting some form of regulation of
specialization and delegating the task to the Board of Governors. 225 A

back to before the adoption of the Canons of Ethics. See Report of the Special Committee to
Study the Matter of Amendment to Canon 27, 76 A.B.A. REP. 437, 438 (1951).
221. See Gerhart, supra note 50, at 730-31.
222. Robert G. Storey, The President's Page, 39 A.B.A. J. 91, 91, 158 (1953).
223. Special Committee on Specialization and Specialized Legal Education, 79 A.B.A. REP.
582, 583 (1954).
224 . See id.
225 . The recommendations were:
1. That the American Bar Association approves in principle the necessity to
regulate voluntary specialization in the various fields of the practice of the law for the
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subcommittee of the Board of Governors proposed creation of "The Council
of Legal Specialists," which would have the exclusive authority both to
establish fields of specialization and to regulate any "Society" of legal
specialists organized within those fields. 226 Opposition to this proposal led
to withdrawal of the recommendation pending an October 14, 1954 meeting
of the Board of Governors. 227 At that meeting, speakers overwhelmingly
opposed the proposal of the Board of Governors, and the Board decided to
defer any action. 228
The most thorough response to the Board's proposal, a statement by the
ABA's Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, was published in
Unauthorized Practice News. The Committee based its opposition to established fields of specialization on the traditional understanding of professionalism. One professionalism argument focused on the difference between the
profession of law and the pursuit of business: "[T]he proposal is concerned

more with labels and with the obtaining of clients than with the establishment
of standards to be enforced by appropriate sanctions. "229 The Committee
added:
[T)he proposal is more than likely to result in the creation of a number of
"splinter groups" of lawyers whose activities will not bear so much on the
policing of the field as on the exchange of information and the obtaining
of clients . The so-called "Societies" are more apt to be like trade associations or craft unions than like the true professional societies needed for the
purpose.230

This, the Committee believed, would lower "the standards of the entire

protection of the public and the bar, and
2. That the American Bar Association approves the principle that in order to
entitle a lawyer to recognition as a specialist in a particular field he should meet
certain standards of experience and education, and
3. That the implementation, organization, and financing of [a] plan of
regulation to carry out such principles is delegated to the Board of Governors, subject
to final approval by the House of Delegates.
Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 79 A.B.A. REP. 447, 450 (1954).
226. See Report of Subcommittee of the Board of Governors Implementing the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Specialization and Specialized Legal Education, 79 A.B.A.
REP. 403, 403 (1954).
227. See Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 79 A.B.A. REP. 115, 137 (1954) .
228. Editor's Note, 42 A.B.A. J. 610, 610-11 (1956) .
229 . Statement of Committee on Unauthorized Practice of lAw on Specialization and
Specialized Legal Education, UNAUTHORIZED PRAC. NEWS, Dec. 1954, at 4, 5 [hereinafter
Unauthorized Practice Committee Statement] .
230. Id.
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profession. " 231
The second professionalism argument relied on the older understanding
of law and lawyers. The Committee asserted, "[T]he law is a seamless web;
. . . it cannot be divided into separate compartments; and . . . a general
knowledge of and proficiency in the law is required for its successful practice
in all fields . "232 The Committee then predicted that the proposal would be
"particularly offensive to the country lawyer" :233
The country lawyer is of necessity a general practitioner. . . . [Country
lawyers] are proud of the fact that they are lawyers, in the traditional sense
of the term, and not specialists and they will resent the Association's
recognition and approval of this newly created and self appointed class of
experts within the profession.234

Even so, a number of commentators claimed that the era of legal
specialization was at hand. As in the 1930s, most of these commentators were
legal academics or elite corporate lawyers. In 1954, in celebration of its 200th
anniversary, Columbia University sponsored a symposium on the topic of The
Metropolis in Modem Life.23 s The subsequently published collection of
articles generated by the symposium included a study of the impact of the
large city on the professions. Two commentators on this study were Reginald
Heber Smith, 236 at that time Director of the Survey on the Legal Profession,
and Columbia University Law School Professor Harry Jones. 237 Smith
believed that the professional practice of law could be maintained only by
specialization, due to the law's "[b]ulk and complexity. "238 The dilemma
lay in maintaining a proper lawyer-client relationship. The solution, according
to Smith, was to organize the practice of law in partnerships of legal specialists.239 Jones agreed, noting, "[I]t is likely that an effort to achieve effective
cooperation among specialists offers more promise than any attempt to tum the

231. ld. at 6 .
232. ld. at 8 . About the "seamless web" the English legal historian Frederic W. Maitland
once wrote: "Such is the unity of all history that any one who endeavors to tell a piece of it must
feel that his first sentence tears a seamless web." Frederic W. Maitland, A Prologue to a History
of English Law, 14 L .Q. REv. 13 (1898).
233 . Unauthorized Practice Committee Statement, supra note 229, at 8.
234. /d.
235 . See THE METROPOLIS IN MODERN LIFE vii (Robert M. Fisher ed ., 1955).
236 . See Reginald H . Smith, Commentary , in THE METROPOLIS IN MODERN LIFE, supra note
235, at 307.
237. See Harry W . Jones, Commentary, in THE METROPOLIS IN MODERN LIFE, supra note
235, at 312.
238. Smith , supra note 236, at 309.
239 . ld.

1046

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:1003

clock back from specialization. " 240 All that was necessary was for legal
educators to ensure that the specialist was provided an education broad enough
to allow the specialist to recognize "interdisciplinary" problems. 241 Two
years earlier, a Washington lawyer named Charles Horsky delivered a series
of lectures at Northwestern University concerning The Washington Lawyer. 242 After explaining the work of the Washington lawyer before administrative agencies and independent commissions, in Congress, and before special
courts like the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Horsky concluded:
"Almost every Washington lawyer is a specialist. " 243
Two members of the ABA's Special Committee on Specialization and
Specialized Legal Education refused to let die the issue of formal recognition
of specialization. In the December 1955 issue of the American Bar Association Journal, the Chairman of the Special Committee, University of Michigan
Law School Professor Charles Joiner, raised the stakes of the debate by
arguing that the legal profession would either control specialization and
prosper from it, or fail to do so and be destroyed by it. 244 In an appeal to
both the professional and economic interests of lawyers, Joiner suggested that
"[i]naction at the present time will be equal to a vote for the uncontrolled
splitting of the profession and its organization into separate warring groups
competing for clients. " 245 In Joiner's view, the only way to prevent fragmentation of the legal profession was to acknowledge and regulate legal
specialization. Further, Joiner felt that regulation was necessary to prevent the
problem of the "in-looking" specialist, who interpreted everything in terms of
the particular specialty. 246
Another member of the Special Committee, a seventy-year-old elite

240. Jones, supra note 237, at 312.
241. ld. at 313 .
242. CHARLES A. HORSKY, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER (1952). Horsky was a long-time
lawyer at Covington & Burling . See JOSEPH C. GoULDEN, THE SUPERLAWYERS: THE SMALL
AND POWERFUL WORLD OF THE GREAT WASHINGTON LAW FIRMS 28-31 (1972).
243. HORSKY, supra note 242, at 161; accord GoULDEN, supra note 242, at 16 ("Washington
Law is highly specialized, and highly fragmented . .. . ").
244. See Charles W. Joiner, Specialization in the Law: Control It or It Will Destroy the
Profession,41 A.B.A . I . 1105, 1105 (1955) [hereinafter Joiner, Controllt]. Other, less extreme,
commentaries touting the need for controlled specialization were Charles W. I oiner, Specialization in the Law? The Medical Profession Shows the Way, 39 A.B.A. I. 539 (1953); Carl G.
Paffendorf, Comment, Legal Specialization-Why The Objections?, 12 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229,
230 (1958) (concluding that benefits of controlled legal specialization included "a more learned
and proficient crop of attorneys" and "the satisfaction of a great public need"); and Henry S.
Drinker, Legal Specialists: Specialized Legal Service, 41 A.B.A. I . 690 (1955).
245. Joiner, Control It, supra note 244, at 1105.
246 . Id. at 1170. I oiner tied this argument to the case against unauthorized practice of law.
Without regulation of specialization, Joiner claimed, "those interested in the prevention of
unauthorized practice will have little ammunition." Id.
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lawyer named Harrison Tweed 247 gave the Fourteenth Annual Benjamin N.
Cardozo lecture. 248 Tweed was a founding partner in the white-shoe New
York City finn of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy and was an expert
in estates and trusts. Tweed's father spent most of his legal career as a
railroad lawyer, working as general counsel to the Chesapeake & Ohio
Railway Company and the Southern Pacific Company.
His maternal
grandfather was William M. Evarts, the famous New York trial lawyer of the
mid-to-late nineteenth century. Tweed was a prominent advocate of legal aid
and was thrice President of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, the oldest bar organization in continuous existence. 249
Tweed's lecture was titled The Changing Practice of Law." Tweed' s
concern was not with lawyers in large finns, who he believed adequately
performed their work, but with lawyers practicing alone. 250 Tweed suggested that the opponents of legal specialization were holding onto the false
premises of the ideal of the omnicompetent lawyer and the seamless web of the
law. Although a lawyer in the past might have been able to know all of the
law, the complexity of modem life and law made that a practical impossibility.
Even the most knowledgeable lawyer knew just part of the law. Consequently, the lawyer necessarily specialized to practice law professionally. 251 At
a time when accountants/tax preparers and others began to use their specialized
expertise to take work from lawyers, 252 the only ethical response was for
lawyers to specialize as well. If bar associations attempted to assert a
monopoly for lawyers in all tax work by charging accountants with the
unauthorized practice of law, lawyers would be engaged in trade union-like
protectionism at its worst. 253

247 . On Tweed, see generally Roger K. Newman, Harrison Tweed, in DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY: SUPPLEMENT EIGHT 1966-70, at 662 (John A. Garraty & Mark C.
Carnes eds . , 1988).
248 . The lecture was given in late October 1955 to the members of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York and was published as TwEED, supra note 88 .
249 . Tweed's grandfather William Evarts was the first president of the Association. See
GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS, supra note 51, at 23 .
250. See TwEED, supra note 88, at 15-17.
251. Tweed observed :
Many lawyers have learned that most clients require a proficiency which the
lawyer cannot give if he has spread his education and reading and experience over the
entire legal territory . In order first to have clients and then to be able to conscientiously handle their legal problems, a proficiency is necessary which can be acquired
only by a certain amount of specialization.
ld. at 17.
252 . The intrusion by accountants and others into the work of the lawyer was noted by Fortune
in its May 1949 portrait of the profession, see The U.S. Bar, supra note 217, at 174-76, and was
the subject of a student-written note in the mid-1950s, see Note, The Practice of Taxes as the
Practice of Law: The Lawyer-Accountant Dispute, 39 MINN. L . REv. 873 (1955) .
253. See TwEED, supra note 88, at 11 & n.12.
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The claim that specialization was necessary was made to a profession in
which two-thirds of its 177,000 members in private practice were sole
practitioners. 2S 4 Although both professionalism and economic arguments
were made in favor of formal recognition of specialization, the easier
argument was the economic argument. Empirical data showed that the larger
the law firm (and thus, it was claimed, the greater the legal specialization), the
greater the income of the lawyer. Blaustein and Porter reported that sole
practitioners earned less than one-fifth the annual incomes of lawyers in firms
of nine or more members2Ss and that pairs of lawyers who worked as
partners earned fifty percent more than sole practitioners. 2S 6
The professionalism argument was more difficult. One classic justification of the lawyer as professional was his knowledge of law. Addressing this
issue, one advocate of specialization acknowledged, "Abraham Lincoln could
practice law in the frontier community of which he was a part without special
competence in any field but with a general facility which enabled him to
handle all types of cases in an acceptable manner. "2S7 For specialization to
succeed, this vision of the ideal lawyer had to be turned on its head. Joiner,
Tweed, and other proponents of specialization claimed that modem life (read
"progress") demanded that lawyers recognize that professional competence
required them to limit their practices. The difficult proposition was to
convince lawyers that specialization suited the ideology of the profession of
law.
The intensity of the effort by corporate lawyers (and their friends) to
connect specialization with professionalism is clearly illustrated by two books
published shortly after Tweed's and Joiner's pleas went unheeded. Arthur H.
Dean, a partner in the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, wrote a biography

254 . See ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES 0 . PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER: A
SUMMARY OF THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 8 (1954).
255. /d. at 11 tbl. 2 (noting that a 1948 study by the Department of Commerce found that the
average income of sole practitioners was $5,759, that the average income of an attorney in a firm
consisting of nine or more members was $27,246, and that comparable median figures were
$4,275 and $21,500, respectively).
256 . Id. This was also true when calculated either as an average or as a median.
257. Charles B. Nutting, Training Lawyers for the Future, Address at the Dedication of the
New Building of the Hastings College of Law (Mar. 26, 1953), in 6 I. LEGAL Eouc. 1, 7
(1953) . Nutting was not defending the classic position, for he also said, "One of my theories
about practice is that it is becoming more and more specialized . Although we still tend to think
of the general practitioner, of whom the country lawyer is the prototype, as being typical of our
calling, it is quite evident that he is passing from the scene just as the family doctor is vanishing
into the realm of legend." /d. Most of Nutting's speech was later reprinted in the American Bar
Association Journal. See Charles B. Nutting, Training Lawyers for the Future: Some Theories
About the Practice of Law, Address at the Dedication of the New Building of the Hastings
College of Law (Mar. 26, 1953), in 41 A.B.A. I. 607 (1955).
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of founding \)artner William Dean Cromwell privately published in 1957. 258
Several years later, lawyer and legal scholar Beryl Harold Levy~ 9 wrote a
book titled Corporation Lawyer: Saint or Sinner?. 260 The rehabilitation-indeed, veneration-of the corporate lawyer permeates both books.
According to Dean, Cromwell was unlike the "trial lawyer-politicianstatesman-orator-classicist," but was more suited to the Gilded Age. 261
Cromwell possessed a "flair for figures, [a] passion for facts and more facts,
and [an] insistence on realistic, economic analysis rather than polished
rhetoric, literary allusion or poetical quotation, " 262 the strengths of the trial
lawyer. Not only was this new breed of attorney a "hard-headed business
counsellor[]," but he also enjoyed the "creative imagination ... to devise new
legal forms. " 263 Dean's biography of Cromwell portrayed the work of the
office lawyer as the highest and best use of the intelligent lawyer's abilities.
In other words, the shift of the professional elite from the trial lawyer to the
office lawyer was made not for monetary reasons, but for reasons of intellect,
or knowledge. 264
Dean's biography of Cromwell takes a curious tum near its middle. In
a twelve-page digression, Dean discussed the nature of the practice of law in
the large law firm. 26s More particularly, he tried to dispel the charge that
specialization had adversely affected the profession of law. Criticizing Justice
Stone's 1934 speech at the dedication of the University of Michigan Law

258. DEAN, supra note 46.
259. Levy has recently written an illuminating sketch of his own life and work. See BERYL
H. LEVY, ANGLO-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS DEVELOPMENT
AND OUTCOME xv-xxiii (1991).
260. LEVY, supra note 46.
261. DEAN, supra note 46, at 52.
262. ld.
263 . ld. at 53.
264. A similar argument.was made by a New York and Virgin Islands lawyer named Roger
Siddall, whom Tweed cited with approval:
The practice of law is an art, in many instances a high art, and as with . . . many
other artistic pursuits the best results are obtained where there is a substantial divorce
between the activity of the pursuit itself and the objective of obtaining monetary
compensation.
That this is an impractical ideal and pretty much a visionary conception in the
practice of a small office I agree but in a large office things can be different and the
ideal can come closer to achievement. I have seen it with my own eyes and I know
it can happen .
ROGER B. SIDDALL, A SURVEY OF LARGE LAW FIRMS IN THE UNITED STATES 132, quoted in
TwEED, supra note 88, at 51-52 n.l9.
Siddall later voiced in the American Bar Association Journal his disdain for the call for
acknowledgment and regulation of legal specialization. See Roger B. Siddall, Specialization in
the Law: A Retort to Professor Joiner's Call for Control, 42 A.B.A. I. 625 (1956).
265 . See DEAN, supra note 46, at 76-87 .
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Quadrangle, 266 Dean argued that "in [Stone's] widely shared fear there is
some of the deceptive plausibility of the half truth. " 267 Like Reginald Heber
Smith and Harrison Tweed, Dean concluded that the cause of specialization
was the increasing complexity of society, not the rise of the large firm. The
lawyer's intelligent contemporaries in business accepted the lawyer's counsel
only if it was based on expert knowledge, and that expert knowledge was
found in the large law firm, just as in the past it was once found in the sole
practitioner. Using the offering of Ford Motor Company stock by the Ford
Foundation as an example, Dean concluded:
A considerable amount of close cooperation between specialists in a
number of fields, and therefore of practice in partnership, is simply
unavoidable if today's commerce is to receive the competent advice
required to permit its nationwide and frequently worldwide scope of
operati_ons to continue on the unrelenting and exacting time tables now
customary in financial matters. 268
Returning to Cromwell, Dean suggested that Cromwell epitomized the
true legal professional:
Cromwell never forgot that he was first and foremost an "officer of the
court," a professional man. . .. He had a high standard of ethics and lived
up to his code. He fought hard on behalf of his clients. But he never
thought that his duty to his clients, which he placed very high, required
him to forego his duty to his country or his duty to the courts, or, indeed,
to society. 269
As an officer of the court and conscious of his duty to society, Cromwell was
the modem embodiment of the lawyer as professional, and a worthy historical
heir to Abraham Lincoln, the personification of the country lawyer.
Levy's book offers many of the same judgments found in Dean's
biography. 27° For Levy, like Dean, the story was straightforwardly instrumental: Before 1870, life and the economy in America were simpler. The

266. See supra text accompanying notes 198-201.
267 . ld. at 81.
268. ld. at 85 . Then, like many others before and after him, see, e.g., GLENN GREENWOOD
& ROBERT F. FREDERICKSON, SPECIALIZATION IN THE MEDICAL AND LEGAL PROFESSIONS
(1964), Dean analogized the specialization of legal practice to specialization in the medical
profession, see DEAN, supra note 46, at 85.
269. DEAN, supra note 46, at 167.
270 . For example, much of Chapter 9 of Corporation lAwyer, titled Cromwell: The
Institutional Firm, is taken almost directly from Dean. Compare LEVY, supra note 46, at 51-69
with DEAN, supra note 46 .

1994]

A HISTORY OF LEGAL SPECIALIZATION

1051

industrial revolution gave birth to the "Office Corporation Lawyer" 271 and
caused the death of the courtroom lawyer, for the court room was inefficient,
cumbersome, and creaky. 272 Levy wrote, "[T]he typically big-league lawyer
today is a partner in a large law office of specialists in various phases of
corporate and financial law. " 273 He felt that although large law firms were
indeed "factories," with a "high degree of division of labor and specialization, " 274 lawyers in such firms should not feel guilty, for they were true
exemplars of the "bar's best tradition. " 275 Again like Dean, Levy cited
Justice Stone's excoriation of the profession,276 but reminded his readers that
lawyers were "supported and strengthened by the persisting tradition of an
independent bar," whose members remained officers of the court. 277 To
Levy, it was wrong for lawyers "to cling to the idea of an omnicompetent
lawyer" and to reject "special certificates for legal specialists. "278 Just as
in the medical profession, the "necessity for specialization" existed in the legal
profession. 279
In the 1960s, the ABA twice renewed its efforts to formally recognize
legal specialization. In 1961 the Board of Governors created a new Special
Committee on Recognition and Regulation of Specialization in Law Practice. 280 The Special Committee in 1962 presented to the House of Delegates
a much more modest proposal than the 1954 Special Committee's. 281 Even
this more modest plan to formally certify lawyers was opposed by lawyers
outside the elite of the bar. 282 What is most interesting about the opposition

271. LEVY, supra note 46, at 22.
272. ld. at 24-25.
273. Id. at 25 .
274. ld. at 38.
275 . ld. at 85.
276. ld. at 169-71.
277. ld. at 173.
278. See id. at 154.
279 . ld.
280. See Report of the Board of Governors, 81 A.B.A. REP. 54 (1962). Two members of the
Committee were Charles Joiner and Harrison Tweed . Special Committees of the Association, 81
A.B.A. REP. 44, 54 (1962) .
281. See Proceedings of the 1962 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 48 A.B.A. I.
353, 362-63 (1962); John C. Satterfield, The President's Page, 48 A.B.A. I. 3 (1962). Instead
of creating a Council of Legal Specialists and urging the creation of specialized legal societies,
the 1962 proposal suggested the undertaking of minimal work to obtain a "certificate of
proficiency" administered by an ABA Council on Certification with the advice and counsel of the
various sections of the ABA. A certificate of proficiency would not limit the holder's ability to
practice in other areas . See Proceedings of the 1962 Midyear Meeting of the House ofDelegates,
supra, at 362-63 .
282. See Specialization Proves Spicy Subject, 19 I. Mo. BAR 202 (1963) (reprinting article in
LAW. Ass'N KAN. CITY NEWSL.) (reponing vote in opposition to the ABA's proposal by the
Lawyers Association of Kansas City); Majority Oppose Specialization Certification, N.J. L.J. ,
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is the change in its reasons for opposing formal recognition of specialization.
Instead of challenging the proposal by extolling the virtues of the country
lawyer83 and the seamless web of the law, opponents conceded the existence
and inevitability of legal specialization. 284 They premised their opposition
primarily on the economic and professional consequences of the segmentation
of the profession and secondarily on the limited judgment of specialists. 285
A year later, after hearing so much opposition, the Committee concluded:
"[T]he bar of the country either does not want specialization controlled or is
not prepared to accept regulation at this time. " 286
The debate between proponents and opponents of formal recognition of
legal specialization was a staple of legal periodicals during the rest of the

Nov. 22, 1962, at 1 (noting opposition of New Jersey State Bar Association to ABA proposal).
283 . The only "country lawyer" argument made in the two debates cited in note 282, supra,
was the argument of Dean Frederick D. Lewis of the University of Kansas City Law School that
country lawyers might resent specialists because their work might not qualify them as specialists.
See Specialization Proves Spicy Subject, supra note 282, at 203. One member of the ABA
Special Committee, Arch Cantrall, a self-styled "country lawyer," claimed that appellation in
arguing in favor of the Committee's proposal, although he was once Chief Counsel of the Internal
Revenue Service under President Eisenhower. See Arch M. Cantrall, A Country Lawyer Looks
at "Specialization", 48 A.B.A. I. 1117 (1962).
284. See Russell D. Niles, Ethical Prerequisites to Certification of Special Proficiency, 49
A.B.A. I. 83 (1963) (beginning opposition to proposal by stating: "It is not the purpose of this
article to challenge the desirability, the necessity or even the inevitability of specialization in the
legal profession."); Specialization Proves Spicy Subject, supra note 282, at 203; ABA
Certification of "Special Proficiency": Contra-Another Primrose Path, N .I. L.J., Nov . 8, 1962,
at 4 (beginning opposition to ABA proposal with the statement: "Specialization in legal practice
is a fact. "). As Dean of New York University Law School, Niles made a similar statement in
the school's Bulletin in another argument against the ABA's proposal. See Russell D. Niles,
Specialization v. General Education, 2 N.Y.U. L. CENTER BULL. 2 (Winter 1962) ("[C]lients
realize that specialization is important, because of the complexity of the law .... ") .
285 . See Specialization Proves Spicy Subject, supra note 282, at 203 (noting that Frederick
Lewis opposed certification proposal on grounds that "he was not convinced that specialists were
equipped to handle general legal problems alone" and that "the public image of the lawyer as a
man who could look at and analyze a legal problem would be changed to a man who could look
at only certain types of legal problems "); ABA Certification of "Special Proficiency":
Contra-Another Primrose Path, supra note 284, at 4 (noting problems of "professional myopia"
and the eclipse of professional control "by the self constituted 'colleges' of specialists," and
worrying that specialization would succeed "to the detriment of the larger perspective of the
general practitioner and his freedom from the specialist's pre-commitment to find a solution
within the fenced boundaries of his own domain") .
Professor Joiner anticipated these arguments in Joiner, Control It, supra note i44, at 1108,
1170, but without apparent effect. Professor Richard Hams berger also suggested that because
approved law lists recognized legal specialists, the problem of fragmentation already existed. See
RichardS. Harnsberger, Publication of Specialties and Legal Ability Ratings in Law Lists, 49
A.B.A. I . 33 (1963).
286. Report of the Special Committee on Recognition and Regulation of Specialization in Law
Practice, 88 A.B.A. REP. 672, 672 (1963).
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decade. Proponents continued to argue that because legal specialization was
a fact of lawyerly life, competent lawyers were those who limited their
practice, and that efficient use of legal services often required the use of
lawyers with particular expertise in the law. 287 Some opponents abandoned
the traditional claim of the professional lawyer's knowledge of all of law,
arguing instead that specialists lacked the judgment to properly serve the
public role designed for lawyers by our political system. 288
In the late 1960s, the ABA made one more effort to deal with the
problem of specialization. The result was another setback for proponents of
formal recognition of specialists. In 1965, the ABA Board of Governors
created a Special Committee on Availability of Legal Services to study and
make recommendations concerning the adequacy and availability of legal
services. 289 In 1967, the Special Committee concluded: "Recognition and
regulation of specialization in the practice of law will measurably improve the
availability of legal services to those who should be in need of them. "290
The Special Committee recommended that the House of Delegates request the
Board of Governors to "further consider the matter of recognition and
regulation of voluntary specialists in the various fields of the practice of law
for the benefit and protection of the public and of the Bar. " 291 Although the
Board of Governors amended the Special Committee's recommendation so that
the House of Delegates would instead request the Board to renew its efforts to
implement the ABA's 1954 resolutions, 292 the House of Delegates refused
to vote in principle in favor of this recommendation and placed the issue back
before the Board of Governors, 293 which created the Special Committee on

287 . See BARLOW F. CHRISTENSEN, SPECIALIZATION 3 (tent. draft 1967) ("There is little room
for doubt that specialists can provide legal services superior in quality to those performed by
generalists."); John P. Bracken, Specialization in the Law: A Fact and Not a Theory, 53 A.B.A.
I. 325 (1967); Elliott E. Cheatham, The Growing Need for Specialized Services, 16 VAND. L.
REv. 497 (1963); Gary N. Hagerman, Comment, Legal Effects of Attorney Specialization, 30
ALB. L. REv. 282 (1966); Elwin A. Andrus, Legal Specialization, WIS. B. BULL., Aug. 1969,
at 9.
288. See, e.g., Willard H. Pedrick, Collapsible Specialists, 55 A.B.A. I . 324, 324-25 (1969) .
289. See Report of the Board of Governors, 90 A.B.A. REP. 364, 365 (1965).
290. Supplemental Report of the Special Committee on Availability of Legal Services: Report
on Specialization, 92 A.B.A. REP. 584, 584 (1967) [hereinafter Report on Specialization]; accord
Chesterfield H. Smith, Increased Availability of Legal Services Through Specialization, Address
at the National Conference of Bar Presidents (Aug. 6, 1966), in 40 FLA. B.I. 1219 (1966).
Smith, later a President of the ABA, also served as Chairman of the Special Committee on
Specialization.
291. See Report on Specialization, supra note 290, at 584.
292. SeeSupplementalReportoftheBoard of Governors, 92 A.B.A. REP. 372, 372-73 (1967) .
293 . See Proceedings of the House of Delegates at the 1967 Annual Meeting, 92 A.B.A. REP.
316, 336-38 (1967).
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Specialization. 294 After two years of study, the Special Committee on
Specialization concluded in 1969 that the ABA should not promulgate a
national plan of specialization until learning from experimental specialization
programs conducted at the state and local level. 29S
D. The End of the Beginning: 1970-Present

The ABA' s role since 1970 has been to strengthen the efforts of states to
implement specialization programs. Through promulgating the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility and Model Rules of Professional Conduct, by
acting as a clearinghouse for information, and in creating a model specialization certification plan for states to adopt, the ABA has continued to view
formal recognition of legal specialization as central to its mission to represent
of the views of the bar. One consequence of the ABA' s efforts is the
insistence by current leaders of the bar elite that specialization defines the
lawyer as a professional.
California, in 1973, 296 and Texas, in 1974,297 were the first two states
to create programs certifying lawyers as specialists. These pilot programs
each selected three fields for certification, fields of law in which the nonelite
lawyer practiced. California chose workmen's compensation, criminal law,
and taxation. 298 Texas chose the fields of family law, criminal law, and
labor law. 299
Both programs were premised on the assumption that certification of
specialists protected the public interest by ensuring the competence of
lawyers. 300 The image of the competent lawyer, just as Tweed had envi-

294. See Report of the Board of Governors , 93 A.B.A. REP. 136, 141-42 (1968) .
295 . See Proceedings of the 1969 Midyear Meeting of the House ofDelegates, 94 A.B.A. REP.
115, 129-32 (1969) .
296 . See Standards for Specialization Announced, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 80 (1973) . The Ninth
Circuit in 1976 rejected a constitutional challenge to the California plan. See Brady v. State Bar,
533 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1976). In 1982, California made its pilot program permanent. See Board
Adopts Permanent Specialization Program, CAL. LAW., May 1982, at 43, 43-44 . For background on the California plan, see generally Comm. on Specialization, State Bar of Cal. , Final
Report, 44 J . ST. B. CAL. 493 (1969) [hereinafter Specialization Committee Report] .
297. Richard Wells, Certification in Texas: lncreasing Lawyer Competence and Aiding the
Public in Lawyer Selection , 30 BAYLOR L. REv . 689, 689 n.1 (1978). Wells was Executive
Director of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.
298. See Specialization Committee Report, supra note 296 , at 511 .
299 . Wells, supra note 297, at 691.
300. Compare Specialization Committee Report, supra note 296, at 500 (concluding that "an
increase in the number of competent specialists will improve the overall quality of the legal
services rendered by lawyers to clients because specialists can maximize both their experience
and their continuing legal education"); with Wells, supra note 297, at 689-90 ("The twin goals
of the certification specialization programs are : (1) to increase lawyer competency through

1994]

A HISTORY OF LEGAL SPECIALIZATION

1055

sioned, 301 was not the lawyer who claimed to know all of law, but the
lawyer whose knowledge was limited to specific areas of law. 302 As the
Committee on Specialization of the State Bar of California stated: "Some
degree of specialization is a necessity of modem law practice. The law that
applies to our complex society is such that no single lawyer can perform all
legal tasks required .... Thus, the 'seamless web' analogy may have to be
abandoned, or at least modified. " 303
More generally, proponents of certification specialization programs
reversed the argument that formal recognition of specialization would cause
the fragmentation of the profession. Instead of specialization's causing
fragmentation, the failure to formally recognize specialization would cause
those lawyers already specializing in particular fields to develop "narrow and
autonomous self-policing units. "304 Such a result would benefit neither the
profession nor the public. A related threat to the unity of the legal profession,
but especially to the general practitioner, was the growth of group legal

continuing legal education, testing, peer review, and involvement in the field, and (2) to inform
the public who the specially competent attorneys are in the particular field of law in which legal
assistance is sought.").
This was the same reason used by Chief Justice Warren Burger in his quest to certify trial
lawyers. See Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and
Certification ofAdvocates Essential to Our System ofJustice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973).
But see MichaelS. Ariens, A Uniform Rule Governing the Admission and Practice of Attorneys
Before United States District Courts, 35 DEPAUL L. REv. 649 (1986), in which I noted that
empirical data on the incompetence of trial lawyers was lacking and proposed a uniform rule
through which lawyers would be qualified to practice before all United States district courts .
301. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
302. "If the assumption of omnicompetence is no longer valid-and there can no longer be any
real doubt that it is not-why do lawyers continue to cling to it so tenaciously?" CHRISTENSEN ,
supra note 287, at 17. See also id. at 13-18. Proponents of bar-regulated plans of specialization
regularly cited surveys indicating that lawyers viewed themselves as specialists. See, e.g., David
R. Brink, Specialization: A Changing Climate, in A MATTER OF COMPETENCE: MANDATORY
CLE AND SPECIALIZATION 26, 32-33 (1979).
303. Specialization Committee Report, supra note 296, at 499-500. Others agreed. See, e.g.,
CHRISTENSEN, supra note 287, at 18 ("Finally, and perhaps most importantly, lawyers may be
loath to abandon the pose of omnicompetence in favor of specialization because of what
specialization suggests about the law itself. First, and most obviously, it suggests that the
'seamless web' analogy might have to be abandoned, or at least modified. If specialization is
possible and desirable, then clearly the law does have some seams."); cf. Stanley B. Kent,
Problems of Specialization, 7 L. OFF. EcoN . & MGMT. 385, 388 (1967) ("Specialization does
not challenge the seamless web concept and fully recognizes the indivisibility of the law. At the
same time, it is possible to mark out a certain specific area within the web, enumerate the skills
it particularly demands, and require, for accreditation, evidence of mastery of these skills.") .
304. Specialization Committee Report, supra note 296, at 501; accord Brink, supra note 302,
at 41; Smith, supra note 290, at 1224. The same argument was made in 1955 in Joiner, Control
It, supra note 244, at 1105.
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services. 305
During this time, the attack on formal legal specialization was based not
on protecting the ideal of the country lawyer, but on economic grounds. · In
several articles, Marvin Mindes, a lawyer and sociologist, attacked formal
specialization programs as attempts by the legal profession to increase its
members' incomes by giving them the opportunity to claim greater status as
experts. 306 Antitrust attorney Jerome Hochberg made the same argument in
a book edited by Ralph Nader and Mark Green:
Specialization, certification, [continuing legal education] and tii.al advocacy
licensing all have a certain plausibility. They can assure clients that the
lawyers who serve them have been trained and approved for the task.
They can lead to greater lawyer efficiency, which in turn can result in cost
savings passed on to clients . So much for theory. In fact, these programs
construct new and formidable barriers to free and open competition in the
market for legal services . They reduce the supply of lawyers in critical
areas, which will, if the medical specialties provide any analogy, lead to
higher fees charged, not lower ones .307
Because both critics and proponents were operating without the benefit of
any empirical data, the response to the charge of rent seeking was the
following syllogism: Specialization resulted in enhanced lawyer competence
and greater facility with the particular law involved; knowing the law meant
less time (and, thus, money) was spent on the legal problem; and therefore,
specialization led to greater savings, not higher costs, for clients.
The two traditional arguments against legal specialization were based on
knowledge and independence. The first argument was made only in a diluted
fashion after the 1950s; the second argument disappeared during the 1970s.
Specialists were no longer damned for their inward-looking or narrow-minded
tendencies. Instead, specialization was equated with the issue of access: the
value of specialists was premised on their public duty to provide access to
prospective "consumers" then excluded from lawyering services. 308 The use
of specialists to serve this public function provided the answer to claims that
advertising of specialties might somehow compromise the independence of

305 . See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 287, at 21.
306 . See Marvin W . Mindes, Lawyer Specialty Certification: The Monopoly Game, 61 A. B.A.
J . 42 (1975); Marvin W . Mindes, Proliferation, Specialization and Certification: The Splitting
of the Bar, 11 U. TOL. L. REv . 273 (1980) .
307 . Jerome Hochberg , The Drive to Specialization , in VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 118, 121
(Ralph Nader & Mark Green eds ., 1976); accord Nicholas von Hoffman, Specialization: Raising
the Standards-and the Prices, WASH . POST, Jan. 1, 1975, at Cl.
308 . Lester Brickman, Legal Specialization: An Oller~~iew of Goals and Ethical Considerations,
in LEGAL SPECIALIZATION 5, 11-19 (1976).
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lawyers. In this way, the specialist replaced the independent country lawyer.
The biggest development concerning efforts to promote specialization
plans was the Supreme Court's holding in Bates v. State Bar'09 that lawyer
advertising, if neither false nor misleading, is entitled to at least some First
Amendment protection. One immediate response to Bates was an amendment
to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 310 In 1977, the ABA
amended Disciplinary Rule 2-105 of the Model Code. 311 A second response
was to use the Bates decision to implement the new definition of the
professional lawyer.
The constitutionally guaranteed right of lawyers practicing in legal clinics
to advertise their services would not affect the large-firm lawyer; instead,
Bates, as applied to "routine" legal services, 312 offered clinics the opportunity to engage in unfair competition against the nonelite lawyer. Because the
"false and misleading" limitation of the right to engage in commercial speech
309. 433 u.s. 350 (1977).
310. The ABA adopted the Model Code in 1969 as the successor to the Canons of Professional
Ethics. See Proceedings of the 1969 Annual Meeting of the House ofDelegates, 94 A.B.A. REP.
378, 389-92 (1969).
311. See Supplemental Report of the Board of Governors Concerning Lawyer Advertising, 102
A.B.A. REP. 591, 607 (1977) . As amended , DR 2-105 stated:
(A) A lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as a specialist, as practicing in
certain areas of law or as limiting his practice permitted under DR 2-101(B),
except as follows:
(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office may use the designation "Patents," "Patent Attorney ," "Patent
Lawyer," or "Registered Patent Attorney " or any combination of those
terms, on his letterhead and office sign.
(2) A lawyer who publicly discloses fields of law in which the lawyer or
the law firm practices or states that his practice is limited to one or
more fields of law shall do so by using the designations and definitions
authorized and approved by [the agency having jurisdiction of the
subject under state law] .
(3) A lawyer who is certified as a specialist in a particular field of law or
law practice by [the authority having jurisdiction under state law over
the subject of specialization by lawyers] may hold himself out as such,
but only in accordance with the rules prescribed by that authority .
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSffiiLITY DR 2-105 (1980) (alterations in original) .
Among other changes, the amendment eliminated from DR 2-105(A)(1) the permissibility
of admiralty and trademark lawyers' noting their specialties on letterheads and shingles. DR 2105(A)(2) was added to the rule in direct response to Bates, thus forbidding a lawyer from
advertising any limitation in her practice without prior permission from bar regulators .
312. Justice Blackmun' s opinion for the majority in Bates explicitly limited the right to
advertise prices for legal services to "routine legal services ." Bates, 433 U.S. at 367-68. Justice
Powell severely criticized this view. /d. at 391-92 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting) . The
ABA attempted to limit the effect of Bates by reading it as creating a constitutional right to
advertise only in cases involving routine legal services . See Advertising and the Future, 63
A.B.A. J. 1045 (1977).
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found in Bates would be ineffective to stop most advertisements, even when
the lawyer truly was not an expert in the advertised field, only bar-regulated
specialization plans would protect the nonelite members of the profession from
legal clinics. Protecting the small practitioner was an explicit justification for
acknowledging legal specialization when, in 1979, the ABA promulgated its
Model Plan of Specialization .313 Proponents qf bar-regulated certification
specialization programs argued that those programs would protect the nonelite ·
lawyer from competition from below by giving him a formally recognized
expertise with which to attract clients. 314 When combined with certification
as a specialist, advertising by the nonelite lawyer was no longer the degradation of the profession into a business, but the enhancement of the legal
profession. Formal recognition of nonelite lawyers as experts distinguished
them from lawyers at legal clinics and created a greater unity between the
nonelite and elite specialists.
The goals of the plan were all stated in terms that marked acceptance of
the new understanding of lawyer professionalism: The Model Plan was an
effort to increase public access to legal services, improve the quality of legal
services, and maintain reasonable legal fees. 315 Advertising by lawyers
recognized as specialists increased public access to legal services because it
provided the prospective client important information to distinguish among the

313. See Proceedings of the 1979AnnualMeetingofthe House ofDelegates, 104A.B.A. REP.
821, 846-47 (1979) . The ABA's reasoning was as follows :
Those seeking specialized services now usually find them by going to large law
firms that are known to be organized on a functionally specialized basis . . ..
Other lawyers, including sole practitioners, small firms and young and minority
lawyers, in general do not and cannot now obtain specialized business through
reputation, reference or mass advertising . They are thus at a competitive disadvantage-a disadvantage that can only increase in the future . They are losing ground
rapidly to large firms and clinics.
But what at first seems a paradox is that many lawyers are now perceiving that
the most direct action a bar can take to protect the small practitioner is to propose and
secure adoption of a specialization plan in the state .
Report of the Standing Committee on Specialization, 104 A.B.A. REP. 978 , 982 (1979) ; accord
Brink, supra note 302, at 32. Brink was the Chairman of the Standing Committee on
Specialization when the Model Plan was adopted . The same argument, couched in professionalism terms , was that unfair competition also harmed members of the public, for they would have
no objective manner in which to select appropriately qualified attorneys. See id.
314.
[The Model Plan] may afford better means to sole and general practitioners, on
whom so much of our American system of delivery of legal services depends , of
competing on a fair basis with the large law firms and specialized legal clinics and
service groups that now dominate the market for specialized legal services.
Report of the Standing Committee on Specialization, supra note 313, at 979 .
315 . STANDING COMM. ON PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, HANDBOOK ON SPECIALIZATION
9 (1983) ; see also Roderick N. Petrey, Introduction to LEGAL SPECIALIZATION, supra note 308,
at 1.
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offers for her business. As a specialist, however, the lawyer remained a
independent professional because advertising, and the resulting access, was
undertaken for the benefit of the public, not simply to make money. 316
Certified specialists were by virtue of their certification prima facie competent
practitioners who knew the law, at least the law in the areas in which they
were certified. The traditional access of clients of large law firms to
competent legal specialists was now provided to the individual in need of
special legal services. Finally, although not empirically verified, the argument
was that specialization offered efficiency, and thus lower prices, for the
resolution of legal problems in our complex legal society.
In the decade that followed, most states either studied or voted on
specialization plans, but at the end of 1990, only fifteen states had adopted any
plan. 317 Why? I am not certain. It is possible that because Bates offered
nonelite members of the profession not only a reason to embrace certification,
but an opportunity to avoid the rigors of certification, nonelite practitioners
concluded specialization certification was unnecessary. If nonelite practitioners did not find themselves in competition with legal clinics, much of the
economic and ideological incentive to support certification disappeared. A
second reason may be that, as noted by Professor Lynn LoPucki, specialization
plans have been "based on a theory of lawyer specialization that bears little
relationship to the complex, de facto pattern of specialization that pervades the
profession. " 318 A third reason may be the fear by nonelite lawyers that
certification of specialization would create hurdles that might exclude (most of)
them from the status of "professional," a status they could continue to claim
as long as the profession was theoretically unified by professional licensure.319
The Supreme Court's decision in Peel v. Attorney Registration and

316 . Justice Blackmun' s opinion in Bates is at odds with this statement. Blackmun wrote,
"Since the belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade has become an anachronism, the
historical foundation for the advertising restraint has crumbled." Bates v . State Bar, 433 U.S.
350, 371-72 (1977).
317. See STANDING COMM. ON SPECIALIZATION, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, STATUS REPORT ON
STATE SPECIALIZATION PLANS (Dec. 1990). However, several states with large populations of
attorneys, including California, Florida, and Texas, have adopted extensive specialization
programs. See id.
318 . LYNN M. LoPuCKI, THE DE FACTO PATTERN OF LAWYER SPECIALIZATION 2 (1990)
(footnote omitted) .
319. This may be so in spite of the ABA's efforts to craft a model plan of certification of
specialists in a way that limits testing requirements in favor of minimum standards of experience,
continuing legal education requirements, and peer review. See Model Plan of Specialization, 104
A.B.A. REP. 983, 986-87 (1979) (listing the minimum standards of specialization as twenty-five
percent of a lawyer's full-time practice in the field for three years; ten hours per year of
continuing legal education in the specialty; and five references from lawyers or judges) .
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Disciplinary Commission, 320 holding that · a state may not prohibit the
nonmisleading advertising of an attorney's certification as a specialist by an
unapproved certification board, effectively has ended the process of barcontrolled certification of specialists. Although the opinions321 leave open
the possibility that some claims of certification may be considered misleading
or may be regulated by the state through required disclaimers, the Court's
decision negates the exclusivity of the authority of bar associations to regulate
claims. to specialization through rules of ethics.322 One interesting consequence of Peel may be that the question whether societies of legal specialists
will fragment the bar will finally be answered; another possible consequence
may be the recognition of a bar already fragmented economically, culturally,
and ideologically. 323
IV. CONCLUSION
The history of legal specialization is a history of the ways in which
lawyers have viewed themselves. Two internally accepted measures of
professionalism, knowledge and independence, have long been intertwined
with the idea of legal specialization. For the profession to view legal
specialization favorably, proponents of specialization needed to alter the
profession's understanding of those two measures. Time and persistence
allowed those advocates to succeed. Their success precipitated a new
understanding of the lawyer's work and duty.
Today, legal specialization is an unexceptional aspect of the profession of
law. It is so unexceptional that assertions of specialization and concentration
are expected of lawyers. In Victoria Stewart's case, the claim to specialization
was so ordinary that the court could quickly conclude that her career was
harmed when she spent two years working outside her chosen specialty. 324

320. 496 u.s. 91 (1990) .
321 . Peel was a 5-4 decision. Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment only .
322. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.4 (1983) (amended 1989 & 1992),
adopted in 1983, was substantially the same as amended DR 2-105 of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. Like DR 2-105, it forbade lawyers from advenising a specialty other
than patent or admiralty law except as permitted by a state cenification program. See id. As
written, Rule 7.4 became unenforceable as a result of Peel, but it has since been amended to
require a disclaimer whenever a lawyer advenises an unapproved cenification. See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.4(c)(2) (1993) . However, the amended version may
also be unconstitutional.
323. See Edward 0. Laumann & John P. Heinz, Specialization and Prestige in the Legal
Profession:TheStructureofDeference, 1977 A.B.F. RES. J. 155. Forexamplesofvariousareas
of difference among lawyers, see generally JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO
LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982) (analyzing the results of sociological
studies of Chicago lawyers' organizational, social, and ideological values) .
324. Stewan v. Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1992) . Of course, the coun was
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There is an irony in the Stewart case that may close the circle of this
history of legal specialization. The ftrst specialists were lawyers at large law
firms, mainly located in New York. According to his biographer, the
progenitor of many of those law ftrms was a lawyer named Walter S. Carter,
known for his work with Paul D. Cravath and Charles Evans Hughes, among
many others. ns What is not as well known is that Walter S. Carter was also
credited by his biographer as the progenitor of the law ftrm of Jackson &
Nash, 326 the same Jackson & Nash that Victoria Stewart alleged damaged her
career as a specialist in environmental law. ·

assuming, for purposes of the appeal, that Stewart's allegations were true.
325 . See KOEGEL, supra note 20, at 1-12.
326. See id. at app. Vlll.

